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3.1 Introduction
During the past several decades, changes in the American economy have
favored college graduates, and a postsecondary degree has become in-
creasingly important in labor market outcomes (Murphy and Welch 1993;
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993). After accounting for inﬂation, the in-
comes of those with a bachelor’s degree grew 14.6 percent from 1975 to
1998, while those with only a high school degree experienced a 2.1 percent
decrease.1As a result, access to higher education has become an important
national issue, with the federal government focusing its eﬀorts on ﬁnancial
aid policies designed to help students aﬀord college expenses. Programs
have included grants, such as the Pell Grant, subsidies for working stu-
dents, and loans like the Perkins and Staﬀord Loans. However, with the
Tax Relief Act of 1997, the government introduced a new form of aid to
college students—federal tax credits for higher education expenses. The
passage of the Hope Learning Credit (hereafter referred to as HTC) and
Lifetime Learning Tax Credit (LLTC) marked a shift in the way that gov-
ernmental support would be distributed to postsecondary students and
their families.
When ﬁrst introduced by former President Clinton during a June 1996
commencement speech at Princeton University, the tax credits were touted
as a step toward making “the 13th and 14th years of education as univer-
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1. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, March Current Population Survey.sal to all Americans as the ﬁrst 12 are today” (Greenwood 1996). However,
the proposal also reﬂected Clinton’s intention to provide targeted tax relief
to the middle class (Purdum 1996). As a model for the proposal, Clinton
used the Georgia Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE)
Scholarship. This politically popular program had been instrumental in
getting Governor Zell Miller reelected by appealing to the concerns of
middle class voters (Applebome 1996).2 In a similar fashion, Clinton set
program earnings limits that targeted middle-income families and pro-
moted the credits as a reward to students who worked hard in school. Fur-
thermore, as a credit, the proposal was viewed as being more helpful to the
typical middle-class family than a tax deduction (Purdum 1996).3 To jus-
tify the middle-income target, government oﬃcials assert that the tax cred-
its serve a need since the middle class makes up a large proportion of col-
lege participants but is excluded from other federal grant programs (Stoll
and Stedman 2001).
As with any other ﬁnancial aid program, tax expenditures for higher ed-
ucation are considered a human capital investment and expected to yield
both private and social beneﬁts, including higher individual incomes,
greater productivity, and lower crime rates and government dependency.
However, the particular attraction of using tax credits rather than tra-
ditional grants or loans to promote college participation develops at
least partly from the fact that federal budget rules favor tax expenditures
over discretionary spending programs (Kane 1999b). Consequently, this
was not the ﬁrst time tax credits had been considered to support college
costs. During the mid-1960s and early 1970s, Congress had considered a
couple of proposals.4 However, tax credits for higher education were ﬁ-
nally passed during a time when the government sought to reduce taxes:
The creation of the HTC and LLTC were part of the largest American tax
cut in ﬁfteen years (Gray 1997). After years of debate over incremental
changes to other federal ﬁnancial aid programs, the tax side of the bud-
get served to dramatically increase support for postsecondary educa-
tion.
According to the U.S. Department of Education (DOE), the credits are
projected to eventually beneﬁt 13.1 million students (5.9 million from HTC
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2. The Georgia HOPE Scholarship provides full tuition, fees, and a book allowance to
Georgia residents with a B average who attend an in-state public college. Those students
choosing to attend an in-state private college are given compensation of comparable value.
Beneﬁts were limited to families with less than $66,000 of income during the ﬁrst year and
$100,000 during the second year. Although the original tax credit proposal also included a
grade point average requirement, this criterion was eliminated before the policy was signed
into law.
3. Deductions tend to disproportionately favor upper-income families since they are more
likely to itemize their taxes.
4. Former President Johnson defeated the tax credits proposal by creating the Guaranteed
Student Loan program in 1965, and former President Carter counteracted with the Middle
Income Student Assistance Act in 1978 (Hauptman and Rice 1997).Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses 103
Fig. 3.1 Federal expenditure programs, 1997 (year of tax credit passage)
Sources: The expenditure on higher education tax credits is a projection by the Department
of Education based on state-level enrollment, Pell Grant recipient data, and the president’s
ﬁscal year 2000 budget policy. Information on the other programs is from the College Board
(2001b), NCES (1998), and U.S. Census Bureau (2000).
and 7.2 million from LLTC) at a cost of $9.7 billion (DOE 2000).5 As
shown in ﬁgure 3.1, this estimate is over 50 percent greater than the total
amount spent at the time on the Pell Grant, the primary federal grant pro-
gram. It also exceeds the amount spent on each of the three largest primary
and secondary education programs (Title I, Head Start, and the School
Lunch Program). Furthermore, the expected size of the program is only
20 percent less than expenditures on welfare (Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families [TANF] or Aid to Families with Dependent Children
[AFDC]). Although participation during the ﬁrst three years of the pro-
gram have not met the projections of the DOE, the total amount of tax
credits has increased steadily each year, from $3.4 billion in 1998, the ﬁrst
year of the program, to $4.9 billion in 2000, an increase of 44 percent.6
The distribution of ﬁnancial aid through the tax code is diﬀerent from
other forms of college assistance in several important ways. First, credits
for tuition expenses in the current year do not accrue until the following
year. Due to this timing, the delay between tuition payment and receipt of
5. According to Department of Education estimates based on state-level enrollment, Pell
Grant recipient data, and the President’s ﬁscal year 2000 budget policy.
6. According to calculations by author using data from the Internal Revenue Service, In-
formation Services, Martinsburg Computing Center, Master File Service Support Branch.the tax credit could be up to ﬁfteen months.7 This aspect of the program
diﬀers greatly from most other forms of aid, which are realized at the time
of attendance, and this feature could have serious implications for how the
aid aﬀects college access. If the primary reason individuals do not enroll in
college is due to liquidity constraints—the inability to secure present-day
funding—then this aid is unlikely to increase access. For this reason, crit-
ics have suggested that the credits would only beneﬁt students expected to
attend college regardless of aid rather than individuals on the margin of en-
rolling.
The timing of the tax credits also creates a disconnect between the aid
and activity (college enrollment). This increases the likelihood that the tax
credits will not be used for postsecondary expenses. If students do not in-
ternalize the future payment as aid for present-day college expenses, then
when they receive the support a year later, they may view the tax credit as
income to be spent on other expenses. In a similar fashion, the support is
too late to inﬂuence the educational investments of students who have al-
ready graduated by the time they receive the credit.
On the other hand, the timing of the aid may also be a beneﬁcial feature.
Other forms of aid, particularly grants, might encourage individuals not
well suited for college to enroll since they are not fully responsible for the ex-
penses incurred. This is an adverse selection problem. The tax credits, how-
ever, are unlikely to encourage frivolous investments in higher education
due to the delay in receiving the support. Furthermore, the disconnect be-
tween the aid and college enrollment might also prevent postsecondary in-
stitutions from responding in ways detrimental to students. Critics suggest
that postsecondary institutions may respond to the increase in ﬁnancial aid
by raising their prices. Due to the timing of the credits, colleges may be less
likely to do this since students’ present-day ability to pay has not increased.
A second important feature of tax credits is that there is no cap on the
cost of the credits in terms of forgone tax revenue. Changes in individual
behavior and/or state or institutional policy could quickly increase the es-
timated costs. For example, if a behavioral response to the program in-
creased college enrollment signiﬁcantly, there would be no limit to the
amount of credits that could be claimed. Other governmental aid programs
have experienced exceptional cost increases due to an unexpected re-
sponse. For example, in New Mexico, the number of beneﬁciaries for the
Lottery Success Scholarship so exceeded initial projections that the state
was unable to meet the demand of students and beneﬁts had to be reduced
due to insuﬃcient funds (Selingo 1999; Binder and Ganderton 2001).8
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7. This assumes that tuition is paid in January of one year and taxes are ﬁled in April of the
following year (Conklin and Finney 1999).
8. While the scholarship had 8,000 recipients in 1998–1999, the total rose to 12,000 in 1999–
2000 and was expected to be 16,000 the following year. In 2000–2001 the $16 million in lot-
tery revenue available to fund the scholarship was insuﬃcient to cover the $21.6 million in
costs.There is no similar budget constraint in terms of the higher education tax
credits to limit the amount of beneﬁts. Finally, since the higher education
credits are tax expenditures, they are not subject to review in the annual
federal appropriations process or the periodic reauthorization most fed-
eral programs undergo. Therefore, the regular examination of federal ﬁnan-
cial aid programs by the government will not include this very large pro-
gram (Conklin and Finney 1999).
This paper examines the distribution and impact of the HTC and LLTC
on taxpayers, students, and institutions. By reviewing the literature and an-
alyzing several data sets on tax returns, individual behavior, and institu-
tional activities, I examine three major questions. First, how have the tax
credits been distributed by income? Have they really been a transfer to the
middle class? Moreover, do a signiﬁcant proportion of eligible families
claim the credit, or are the information and transaction costs of distribut-
ing aid through tax credits exceedingly high? Although no program is likely
to reach all eligible students, the higher education tax credits provide a new
opportunity to test how eﬀective it is to deliver college aid through the tax
system. Second, how have the credits aﬀected the college decisions of indi-
viduals? Have they prompted individuals to attend college who would not
have otherwise? Have the credits encouraged students to choose more ex-
pensive colleges? Finally, how have postsecondary institutions responded
to the tax credits? Have they altered their pricing policies in reaction to the
introduction of the federal aid? What role have state governments had in
the actions of their public colleges and universities? While many studies
have tried to predict the likely impact of these higher education credits, this
will be among the ﬁrst to use data since enactment to estimate the actual
results.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 3.2 describes the tax
credits with information on recipient eligibility, the expenses covered, and
other details. Section 3.3 examines how the beneﬁts of the HTC and LLTC
were distributed and whether most eligible families claimed a credit. Sec-
tion 3.4 considers the eﬀect the tax credits have had on student enrollment
decisions. Section 3.5 analyzes the impact on postsecondary institutions
and state policies. Section 3.6 summarizes the results and concludes.
3.2 A Description of the Tax Credits
Before 1997, subsidies for higher education through the tax system were
limited to postsecondary expenses for employment-related training (Cro-
nin 1997). These expenses counted as an itemized deduction but did not
cover training for the preparation of a new career. Additionally, the tax
code allowed parents to claim exemptions for children up to the age of
twenty-four if they were full-time college students and excluded interest on
U.S. savings bonds redeemed to pay for tuition expenses. The only other
special consideration given to higher education by the tax code was the ex-
Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses 105clusion of ﬁnancial aid as income. This included scholarship and fellow-
ship income, veteran’s education beneﬁts, and employer-provided educa-
tional assistance. However, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 broadly ex-
panded the treatment of higher education expenses with the HTC and
LLTC. Table 3.1 summarizes the details of each credit.
The two tax credits complement each other by targeting diﬀerent groups
of students. While the HTC may only be used for a student’s ﬁrst two years
of postsecondary education, the LLTC is available for unlimited years to
those taking classes beyond their ﬁrst two years of college, including col-
lege juniors and seniors, graduate students, and working adults pursuing
lifelong learning.9 For each credit, the expenses covered are tuition and re-
quired fees at an educational institution eligible for aid administered by the
DOE. This amount is net grants, scholarships, and other tax-free educa-
tional assistance including Pell Grants, employer-provided education as-
sistance, and veteran’s educational assistance. The HTC provides a credit
equal to 100 percent of the ﬁrst $1,000 plus 50 percent of the next $1,000
of tuition paid during the tax year (a maximum credit of $1,500). The stu-
dent must be enrolled at least half-time and pursue a degree or other rec-
ognized educational credential in order to be eligible for the HTC. In con-
trast, individuals do not need to be enrolled at least half time or pursue an
educational credential in order to be eligible for the LLTC, thereby making
the credit available to adults taking an occasional college course. The
credit was equal to 20 percent on the ﬁrst $5,000 of out-of-pocket tuition
expenses (a maximum credit of $1,000), and since 2003 the LLTC has been
based on expenses up to $10,000 (a maximum credit of $2,000).10
Figure 3.2 displays how the beneﬁts for each tax credit compare to col-
lege expenses. For each amount of qualiﬁed tuition expenses noted on the
x-axis, the solid lines trace to the amount of the tax credit on the y-axis. The
dashed lines denote the mean costs of diﬀerent types of colleges to high-
light the amount of credit that would be received at that type of school. The
average cost of a public, two-year college during the 1997–1998 school year
would yield a $1,284 HTC or $313 LLTC beneﬁt. The average costs of
other types of schools would yield the maximum credit.11The HTC may be
claimed on payments made after December 31, 1997, for college enroll-
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9. To be eligible for HOPE, an individual must not have completed the ﬁrst two years of col-
lege before the beginning of the tax year in question. Regardless of whether a student is full-
or part-time, he or she may only take HOPE for two years. HOPE also requires that the stu-
dent not have a felony drug conviction.
10. Several criteria originally included in the proposal were eliminated before enactment
(Cronin 1997), including indexing the credit to inﬂation and requiring students to maintain a
B-minus average in order to receive the HOPE. Additionally, the original proposal also al-
lowed adults to deduct up to $10,000 per year ($5,000 in 1997 and 1998) for those enrolled at
least half-time or for courses to improve job skills.
11. For the 1997–1998 school year, the mean tuition cost (enrollment weighted) for a public
two-year college was $1,567, $3,111 for a public four-year college, $7,079 for a private two-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ment after that date, while the LLTC can be claimed on expenses incurred
as early as July 1, 1998, for college or vocational school enrollment begin-
ning on or after July 1, 1998. Families are able to claim the LLTC for some
members and the HTC for others in the same year. However, the same stu-
dent cannot take both credits.
The beneﬁts of the tax credits phase out for higher-income taxpayers.
The phaseout begins at an adjusted gross income (AGI) of $80,000 for a
joint return ($40,000 for single ﬁlers) with no beneﬁt for families with in-
comes above $100,000 ($50,000 for single ﬁlers).12 With these relatively
high thresholds, tax credits for higher education expenses have the most ex-
tensive eligibility of any federal program. Data on tax returns from 1997
suggest that two-thirds of returns during that tax year would have been el-
igible based on ﬁling status (joint or single) and AGI ($10,000 to $100,000
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Fig. 3.2 Tax credit by college expense
Source: Tax credit information from Internal Revenue Service (1998c).
Notes: In 2003, the maximum LLTC will increase to $2,000. For the 1997–1998 school year,
the mean tuition cost (enrollment weighted) for a public two-year college was $1,567, $3,111
for a public four-year college, $7,079 for a private two-year college, and $13,785 for a private
four-year college (College Board 2001a).
12. The AGI is total income minus deductions for items such as alimony, student loans, in-
dividual retirement accounts, and medical savings accounts. For most taxpayers, AGI is equal
to total income. In 1998, only 17.6 percent of returns had any of the aforementioned deduc-
tions. The average deduction adjusted AGI calculation by $2,343 (Campbell, Parisi, and
Balkovic 2000).for joint ﬁlers, $10,000 to $50,000 for single ﬁlers).13 In comparison, Pell
Grants are strictly limited to families with incomes below $40,000. Nearly
90 percent of Pell Grant funds are awarded to families with incomes under
$30,000, and 54 percent of those families have incomes under $10,000
(Kane 1999a).14
3.3 The Distribution of the Tax Credits
The ﬁrst major questions that need to be answered to understand the
eﬀect of the HTC and LLTC are these: How have the beneﬁts been distrib-
uted? Which groups have beneﬁted the most from the credits? Is the policy
progressive or regressive? As intended by Clinton, have middle-income
families been the largest beneﬁciaries of the tax credits? This section ex-
amines these issues using data from the Internal Revenue Service for 1998,
1999, and 2000, the ﬁrst three years of the tax credits. Furthermore, I in-
vestigate the extent to which eligible families have claimed a beneﬁt.
3.3.1 Factors That Inﬂuence the Distribution of Beneﬁts
From the ﬁrst announcement of the tax credit proposal, many have hy-
pothesized about the potential distribution of beneﬁts based on the pol-
icy’s criteria. One important feature of the tax credits is that they are not
refundable. To receive a beneﬁt, individuals must have income suﬃcient to
produce positive federal income tax liability. Furthermore, if a family
claims other tax credits or deductions, this will reduce its ability to beneﬁt
from the HTC or the LLTC.15Therefore, many lower-income groups are in-
eligible to receive a tax beneﬁt (Kane 1997; McPherson and Schapiro 1997;
Hoxby 1998). This fact, coupled with the income caps that prevent indi-
viduals from the most aﬄuent backgrounds from collecting the credit,
suggests that the tax credits primarily beneﬁt students from middle- and
upper-income families.
The middle-class nature of the tax credit is conﬁrmed when one consults
the federal tax forms (Internal Revenue Service 1998a,b). A dependent stu-
dent from a married family of four needs at least $17,900 in family income
to overcome the standard deductions and exemptions necessary to have
tax liability.16 To receive the maximum LLTC ($1,000), this student’s fam-
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13. According to the Internal Revenue Service, Information Services, Martinsburg Com-
puting Center. The proportion of the eligible population based on AGI might be higher since
presumably some married persons ﬁled separately when they might have been eligible had
they ﬁled jointly.
14. Eligibility for Pell depends on an individual’s Expected Family Contribution, which is
a function of income and expected college costs.
15. Other tax credits reduce a family’s tax liability dollar for dollar. Likewise, tax deduc-
tions reduce a family’s AGI, the basis on which tax liability is calculated.
16. This calculation is for the minimum income possible using the 1998 standard deduction
for a “married ﬁling jointly” return ($7,100) and the exemption amount ($2,700 multiplied by
the number of exemptions for incomes below $93,000). The minimum will be higher if a fam-ily income must be at least $24,550, or $27,900 to receive a maximum HTC
($1,500). This suggests that the bottom 30 percent of the 1997 income dis-
tribution was ineligible to take the full HTC beneﬁt due to insuﬃcient tax
liability based on the benchmarks of a dependent student.17 Beginning in
2003, the maximum LLTC increased to $2,000 and dictated that families
must make at least $31,250 to receive the full credit.18 The bottom thresh-
olds are lower for independent students due to a smaller standard deduc-
tion and fewer exemptions.19Independent students must have an income of
at least $6,950 to have some tax liability, $13,600 to be eligible for the full
LLTC, and $16,950 for the full HTC. Due to the income phaseout of eligi-
bility, the top 20 percent of the 1997 income distribution would have been
ineligible to take either the full or any credit. For single ﬁlers, the cutoﬀ is
even lower, making an even larger portion of the distribution ineligible.
Due to other features of the tax code, even eligible middle-income fami-
lies may not be able to reap the full beneﬁt of the tax credits. Claiming the
HTC could subject many middle-income families to the alternative mini-
mum tax (AMT). Although it was designed to ensure that wealthy taxpay-
ers who shelter their incomes from taxation pay a minimum amount,
Knight (1997) suggests that families with incomes as low as $41,350 might
be penalized and not receive the full beneﬁt of the credit. In an article for
the Washington Post, Crenshaw (1997) calculated that a family earning
$64,100 per year with two children in college would normally pay $6,743 in
taxes if ﬁling jointly. If the family claims HTC for one and LLTC for the
other (total $2,500), the tax liability would be reduced to $4,243. However,
under the AMT calculation, the family’s tax liability is $4,966, a $723 re-
duction in the value of the tax credits.
A second important determinant of the distribution of beneﬁts is the
amount of tuition expenses incurred by diﬀerent groups. Therefore, the
distribution of beneﬁts is aﬀected by where individuals attend college. Be-
cause low-income students tend to be concentrated at lower-priced col-
leges, such as public two-year and four-year schools, their likelihood of re-
ceiving the full tax beneﬁt is further reduced. In addition, since the credit
is based on tuition expenses net of grants, the HTC and LLTC interact with
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ily itemizes deductions or takes a credit for dependent care expenses (line 41), elderly or dis-
abled (line 42), children under age seventeen (line 43), adoption (line 45), or foreign taxes (line
46). See Form 1040 for 1998 for more details.
17. The income distribution calculations were made using data on the U.S. income quintiles
and median from the U.S. Census Bureau (1999).
18. A return’s taxable income must be at least $6,650 for a tax of $1,000, $10,000 for a tax
of $1,500, and $13,350 for a tax of $2,000. See the 1998 Internal Revenue Service Tax Table.
19. A student is deﬁned as “independent” if he or she meets one of the following criteria: is
over the age of 24; a veteran; an orphan or ward of the court; a person with legal dependents
other than a spouse; married and not claimed by his or her parents; or a graduate student and
not claimed by his or her parents. A single undergraduate student may be designated as inde-
pendent if he or she is not claimed as a dependent by his or her parents and has been self-
suﬃcient for at least two years.other forms of ﬁnancial aid. Most notably, this includes the Pell Grant, a
means-tested federal aid program for students without a baccalaureate de-
gree. Using the mean tuition levels of diﬀerent types of colleges, Haupt-
man and Rice (1997) estimate that families with incomes below $20,000
will be eligible for the Pell Grant but not the tax credits.20Therefore, the in-
teraction between the Pell Grant and higher education tax credits further
raises the income benchmarks necessary for many individuals to claim the
HTC or LLTC. According to ﬁgures from the U.S. Census Bureau, this
benchmark makes the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution ineli-
gible. Among female-headed households, half would not qualify for a tax
credit.21 In contrast, families with incomes of at least $50,000 would only
be able to receive tax credits. Families between these benchmarks receive a
combination of the two types of aid depending on the Pell Grant award and
college price.
The most important criterion is, of course, college attendance. Since at-
tendance rates diﬀer by income and race, it is clear that the distribution of
beneﬁts is unlikely to be equal across groups even without the importance
of the factors just discussed. Among dependent students aged eighteen to
twenty-four, only 38.3 percent with family incomes in the bottom quartile
participated in college in 1997. In contrast, 78.5 percent of dependent stu-
dents in the top quartile attended college (Jamieson, Curry, and Martinez
2001). However, since one goal of the credits is to encourage participation
in higher education, the incidence of the HTC and LLTC depends on their
impact on college enrollment. If they encourage postsecondary attendance
for certain individuals or groups, the relative beneﬁts by income group or
state could change. This possible eﬀect is investigated in section 3.4.
Based on these criteria, table 3.2 displays the proportion of college stu-
dents that are eligible for a higher education tax credit using data from the
1999–2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS), a na-
tionally representative survey of students. Eligibility for a credit was de-
termined using information on family income, attendance intensity (full-
time, part-time, or less than part-time), tuition expenses, and year in
college. Assuming that the 1999–2000 school year is representative of any
tax year, 43 percent of undergraduates are eligible for either the HTC or the
LLTC.22Over half of master’s and doctoral students are eligible. By college
type, the greatest proportions of eligible students are at four-year colleges
and proprietary schools (for-proﬁt two- and four-year institutions). When
the sample is limited to full-time students, the proportion eligible increases.
Nearly 56 percent of full-time undergraduates are eligible for a tax credit.
Further analysis shows that removing the requirement for net tuition ex-
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20. This assumes full-time enrollment by a college freshman from a married family of four.
21. The median income of a female-headed household in 1997 was $21,023 (U.S. Census
Bureau 1999).
22. Eligibility is measured with some error because it is deﬁned by income rather than AGI.penses would increase the percent eligible for a credit by nearly a third.23
Although students who have no tuition net of aid may still have living ex-
penses, they do not qualify for a tax beneﬁt.
Although there are a myriad of criteria that need to be satisﬁed in order
to qualify for a tax credit including income benchmarks, college atten-
dance, and positive net tuition expenses, a very large share of students are
still eligible for a beneﬁt. This is especially true in comparison to other ﬁ-
nancial aid programs. For example, only approximately one-ﬁfth of stu-
dents in the NPSAS were eligible for the Pell Grant.
3.3.2 Credit Beneﬁciaries by Income:
The Internal Revenue Service Data
Due to the time delay associated with data, little analysis has been done
nationally on the actual beneﬁciaries of the tax credits. The few studies that
use actual data on credit usage (rather than assumed usage) focus on the
University of California (UC) system. Hoblitzell and Smith (2001) exam-
ine usage of the credits by evaluating data collected on nearly 3,500 stu-
dents. They ﬁnd that more than 45 percent of families that claimed a tax
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Table 3.2 Percentage Eligible for the Higher Education Tax Credits
All Students 
(full-time and part-time)
Lifetime Either Tax Full-Time Students:
Hope Learning Credit Either Tax Credit
Student level
Undergraduate 22.33 20.80 43.13 55.94
Master’s n.a. 53.33 53.33 57.27
Doctoral n.a. 52.82 52.82 50.83
Professional n.a. 42.73 42.73 42.91
Other graduate degree n.a. 45.68 45.68 62.09
College type
Public two-year 24.45 10.62 35.06 52.98
Private two-year 35.61 7.68 43.28 55.97
Public four-year 14.58 34.96 49.54 54.42
Private four-year 15.05 37.80 52.85 58.18
Proprietary (for-proﬁt) 32.81 21.01 53.83 70.92
Less than two-year 21.15 12.25 33.40 56.96
Notes:Calculations by author using the 1999–2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Sur-
vey.  Assumes that the 1999–2000 school year is representative of a tax year (January–
December). Eligibility is based on income, year in school, intensity, and having net tuition ex-
penses greater than zero (tuition minus all grants). To make nationally representative, weights
supplied by the survey were used. n.a.   not applicable.
23. Without the requirement of positive net tuition expenses, 66.5 percent of undergradu-
ates and 77.0 percent of master’s and doctoral students would be eligible for a credit.credit earned less than $50,000 per year, and 22 percent earned less than
$20,000 annually. The estimated aggregate amount in tax credits ($80 mil-
lion) was about 85 percent of the $95 million UC students receive in Pell
Grants, the largest federal grant program. Among the 1,282 undergradu-
ate students, 13 percent claimed the HTC (with a mean of $1,119 and 52
percent claiming the maximum) and 14 percent claimed the LLTC (with a
mean of $661 and 28 percent claiming the maximum). Of the 543 graduate
students in the survey, 32 percent claimed the LLTC (with a mean of $743
and 43 percent claiming the maximum). However, students in the UC sys-
tem tend to be more aﬄuent than the general population of college stu-
dents. While the median income of respondents to the UC survey was
$48,670 in 1999, the median U.S. income was $41,994 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 2000). Furthermore, Hoblitzell and Smith estimate that only 37
percent of UC students were eligible for the credits in 1999. These diﬀer-
ences make the Hoblitzell and Smith study diﬃcult to generalize for the na-
tion as a whole and for the population of college students.
To give a national picture of the number of families beneﬁting from the
higher education tax credits, this study uses data on tax returns from the
Internal Revenue Service. The number and amount of credits taken are
shown for the ﬁrst three years of the program in table 3.3.24Duringtax year
2000, nearly 6.7 million credits were claimed amounting to almost $4.9 bil-
lion. Over 5 percent of returns claimed either the HTC or LLTC, and the
mean tax credit was $731. When these ﬁgures are compared to those from
the two previous tax years, it is evident that usage of the credits has grown.
While the mean has remained stable ($726 to $731), the number and total
amount of credits grew 44 and 45 percent, respectively, from 1998 to 2000.
Most of this growth occurred between the ﬁrst and second year of the cred-
its (1998 to 1999). Experience with other federal beneﬁt programs suggests
take-up rates will continue to increase. Participation in the Earned Income
Tax Credit, another beneﬁt program that is distributed through the tax sys-
tem, continued to grow from 70 percent in 1984 to an estimated 80 to 86
percent in 1990 even after a number of policy changes (Scholz 1994).
While many families claimed a higher education tax credit, not all were
able to take the full credit for which they were eligible due to insuﬃcient tax
liability. This happened when families did not have enough income, minus
tax deductions, to generate enough tax liability, net other credits. These re-
turns are deﬁned as nontaxable. Unless a family’s tax liability is exactly
equal to the amount they claimed in education tax credits, these nontax-
able returns indicate the number of returns that were unable to take the en-
tire education credit due to insuﬃcient tax liability, perhaps in conjunction
with the use of other credits. In general, 44 percent of all returns with AGIs
between $5,000 and $100,000 were designated as nontaxable due to taking
Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses 113



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.some tax credit in 1999. The mean is slightly larger for returns that claim
education credits (46 percent).25 This means that half of the higher educa-
tion tax credit beneﬁciaries were not able to take the full credit for which
they were otherwise eligible.
Use of the HTC and LLTC varied considerably by AGI. As discussed, al-
most no individual below $10,000 claimed a credit (1 percent) due to in-
suﬃcient tax liability and the interaction of the tax credit with other forms
of aid. In contrast, 7.3 percent of returns with an income between $30,000
and $50,000 claimed an education credit, while 8.5 percent of families with
incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 received a beneﬁt. This pattern is
also likely to be a function of the diﬀerent types of families in each AGI
group (single adults versus parents with children old enough to be in col-
lege). Individuals with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 claimed the
largest average credit ($902).
Not all taxpayers correctly claimed an education tax credit. Although
they are not eligible for the higher education tax credits, in tax year 2000,
2,965 credits were claimed by returns with over $100,000 in income.26 Ex-
perience from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) suggests that pos-
sibly many more families improperly claimed the credit. Holtzblatt (1991)
and McCubbin (1999) found that a signiﬁcant fraction of taxpayers re-
ceived the EITC when not technically eligible. Taxpayers will adopt a strat-
egy by weighing the tradeoﬀbetween the beneﬁt to misreporting income or
expenses and the corresponding risk of detection and penalty (Allingham
and Sandmo 1972). However, since the higher education tax credits are not
refundable like the EITC, the number of improper claims will be limited to
those with suﬃcient tax liability.
To get a sense of the distribution of costs (tax liability) and beneﬁts (tax
credits) by income, the bottom two rows in panel A of table 3.3 display the
proportion of credits an AGI group claimed divided by the proportion of
returns under $100,000 submitted by that group. Stated another way, this
is an AGI group’s share of beneﬁts divided by its share of the tax burden.
Using the number of returns and credits, families with an AGI between
$20,000 and $29,999 had the same proportion of the education credits as
they did returns. Families with incomes below this amount claimed rela-
tively fewer credits, while returns with higher AGIs claimed a larger share
of credits than their proportion of the tax returns. This suggests that usage
of the credits is skewed toward higher incomes. However, when we compare
the total monetary amount of credits claimed to the tax liability for the
group, the result reverses. Families with AGIs below $50,000 claim rela-
tively more in higher education credits than they pay in taxes.
Instead of comparing across incomes, tables 3.4 and 3.5 compare the
Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses 115
25. Calculations by author using Internal Revenue Service data in Campbell and Parisi
(2001). Nontaxable returns are deﬁned as having no tax liability after all credits and the al-
ternative minimum tax are applied.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.beneﬁts of the tax credits to federal tax liability within an AGI group. The
last row in table 3.4 compares the total amount in tax credits claimed by a
group to its total federal tax liability. For example, for all returns, the total
monetary amount in higher education tax credits was 0.5 percent of the to-
tal federal tax liability of returns for the 2000 tax year. The percentage
ranges from 0.7 to 3.8 for groups eligible for the tax credit, suggesting that
the national mean (0.5 percent) is heavily skewed by individuals with over
$100,000 in income. The amount of tax credits claimed when compared to
tax liability is largest for individuals with an AGI between $10,000 and
$19,999. The beneﬁts were nearly 4 percent as large as the group’s total tax
liability. Likewise, the total amount in credits was 2.3 percent of the total
tax burden for returns between $20,000 and $29,999. This ratio is smallest
for families with incomes above $50,000.
Table 3.5 makes the same comparison but instead uses the mean credit
(for returns with a credit greater than zero) and tax liability. For example,
returns between $10,000 and $19,999 had on average $1,056 in federal tax
liability. Moreover, those that claimed a credit in that group received an av-
erage beneﬁt of $621. This suggests that the mean amount of tax beneﬁts
from the HTC and LLTC covered 58.8 percent of the tax liability for mem-
bers of this group that claimed a credit.27This ratio is lower for groups with
higher AGI. In summary, the credit covers more of the tax liability of low-
income claimants than that of individuals with higher incomes.
In order to fully understand the incidence of the tax credit, it is neces-
sary to consider the federal tax liability of a family over time. Using the
earnings proﬁles estimated with CPS data by Murphy and Welch (1990), I
approximate that individuals with twenty years of work experience (about
the age to have college-age children) earn about 33 times that amount over
the course of their working life.28 Therefore, federal tax liability was multi-
plied by this number to get a return’s lifetime tax burden. Furthermore,
families are likely to receive the education credit for multiple years and per-
haps for multiple children. Assuming a family has two children that attend
college for four years each, the mean education credit was multiplied by
eight. The results of these calculations are shown in the last several rows of
table 3.5. For families that earn less than $20,000, the tax credits (under the
assumptions given) make up about 14 percent of their lifetime tax liability.
The percentage is less than one-third of that for returns with incomes above
$30,000. For example, the total amount of education credits taken by a
family with an AGI between $50,000 to $74,999 would only amount to 3
percent of its lifetime tax liability. However, this rough calculation is not a
118 Bridget Terry Long
27. This calculation implicitly assumes that returns that claim education credits have the
mean characteristics of their AGI group.
28. This assumes that individuals work for forty years. See the diagrams in Murphy and
Welch (1990).good approximation for low-AGI returns if the taxpayer is actually a stu-
dent. In this case, the incomes and tax liabilities are extremely likely to
grow over time, and the assumption of multiplying by 33 will not be accu-
rate.
3.3.3 The Distribution of Credits across States
The distribution of education credits does not vary only across income
groups. States also varied in the amount by which they beneﬁted from the
tax credits. To determine which states have reaped the most in credits, the
2000 data were analyzed by state. Table 3.6 displays the number and
amount of credits claimed by state. While the mean credit claimed by state
is similar to the national mean, there was incredible variation between
states. The mean credit for a state ranged from $552 (New Mexico) to $899
(Pennsylvania). When this is compared to the DOE projections, further
dissimilarities become evident. States like New Jersey claimed 83 percent
of the expected amount in tax credits during the third year of the program.
Meanwhile, the District of Columbia had less than a quarter of the ex-
pected credits.
A number of state characteristics are likely to aﬀect the degree to which
it beneﬁted from the introduction of the higher education tax credits. The
earnings distribution of its residents will determine the proportion eli-
gible by income. The relative size of its population of college-age individ-
uals and the rate of postsecondary attendance will also aﬀect usage of the
credits. Finally, because the HTC and LLTC are awarded based on net tu-
ition expenses, the cost of the colleges that a state’s residents attend will
be inﬂuential.29When the rankings of the states are compared, states with
a larger proportion of returns claiming higher education tax credits did
on average have a larger proportion of their population in college and
higher mean public two-year tuition levels. States with the smallest per-
centage of returns with a credit had the largest mean proportion of eli-
gible returns as determined by AGI but a smaller proportion of residents
enrolled in college and a lower average tuition price at community col-
leges. The eﬀorts of state governments and colleges to inform their stu-
dents of the tax credits could also help explain diﬀerences in usage. For
example, as discussed by Hoblitzell and Smith (2001), the UC system has
actively tried to inform students and parents about the availability of the
credit.
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29. For most students, this will be the cost of an in-state college. Eighty-one percent of ﬁrst-
time freshmen in 1996 attended an in-state college. The proportion is higher for older stu-
dents, including undergraduate upperclassmen, graduate students, and nontraditional stu-
dents (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.3.3.4 Are Eligible Families Taking the Credit?
The NHES and NPSAS Data
Although many families are eligible for the aid, this does not necessarily
mean that they will claim the tax credit. This may be due to a lack of infor-
mation about the beneﬁt or a complicated claiming procedure. It is clear
from the results in the previous section that usage of the credits is well be-
low DOE projections. The Federal Oﬃce of Management and Budget pro-
vides additional support for this notion that many eligible families did not
claim the HTC or LLTC. During tax year 1998, they found that only 36
percent of families with eligible college students claimed the credit. That
yielded 49 percent of the eligible amount to be claimed (Riley 2000).
Since there has been considerable growth in the number and amount of
credits claimed since inception, part of this gap could be due to families
slowly learning about the aid. However, during tax year 2000, the third year
of the policy, of the 13.1 million projected recipients, only 6.7 million re-
turns claimed a credit. Since one return can claim multiple credits (e.g., a
HTC for one child and a LLTC for another), it is better to compare the pro-
jected and actual amount of credits claimed. Although the DOE expected
that $9.7 billion in credits would be awarded, returns only claimed $4.9 bil-
lion in credits, 50.5 percent of the projected amount. Previous studies have
found that individuals eligible for other types of ﬁnancial aid programs do
not necessarily apply to them (Orﬁeld 1992). As with any ﬁnancial aid pol-
icy, awareness of the subsidy is essential to having the desired impact.
Moreover, diﬀering take-up rates by background aﬀects the relative distri-
bution of its beneﬁts.
To further reveal the general level of awareness about the credits and the
proportion and characteristics of eligible families that claimed a beneﬁt, I
consulted two national data sets. The ﬁrst, the National Household Edu-
cation Survey (NHES), asked 8,552 parents in 1999 if they had ever heard
about the HTC or LLTC.30 As shown in table 3.7, most parents were not
aware of the credits. While one-third had heard of one of the credits, only
21.5 and 18.7 percent had heard of the HTC and LLTC, respectively. The
responses by demographic characteristics allow one to draw some infer-
ences about how awareness of the tax credits diﬀered by background.31 In
general, parents from racial minority groups were less likely to know about
the credits than white parents, particularly in the case of the LLTC. Addi-
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30. The NHES is a random-digit-dialed, computer-assisted telephone survey covering all
ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia. It was conducted in January through April of 1999
by the National Center for Education Statistics (see http://nces.ed.gov/nhes/Main/design
.asp).
31. To produce reliable estimates for racial groups, the NHES oversamples black and His-
panic individuals. While the data set provides weights to make the sample nationally repre-
sentative, because the tax questions were only asked for a subset of the sample, they are not
used in this analysis.tionally, awareness of the tax credits increased by household income and
parent’s level of education. Finally, parents with children closer to college
age were more aware of the existence of the tax credits than parents with
younger children. While diﬀerences existed between groups, in no case
were over 40 percent of the parents cognizant of the availability of the tax
credits.
The 1999–2000 NPSAS allows for a more detailed analysis of the char-
acteristics of eligible students and families that did and did not claim a
credit. It provides information on whether a student (or his or her family if
the student was a dependent) claimed a higher education tax credit in 1999.
Students were asked in a computer-assisted telephone interview if they or
their parents had claimed a tax credit. Students who answered “don’t know”
were dropped from the sample. If the usage of the tax credits varies by the
characteristics of eligible families, this could explain why some groups did
not beneﬁt as much as projected. Furthermore, diﬀerences could fore-
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Table 3.7 Percent of Parents Who Have Heard of the Tax Credits, 1999
Lifetime
Either Hope Learning Number of
Tax Credit Tax Credit Tax Credit Observations
Mean 33.3 21.5 18.7 8,552
Race
White 32.8 22.5 21.4 5,355
Black 28.3 22.9 12.9 1,326
Hispanic 22.5 16.2 13.7 1,392
All other races 30.9 23.2 17.8 479
Household income
$10,000 or less 19.3 14.6 10.4 540
$10,001–20,000 22.7 17.2 11.3 851
$20,001–30,000 24.6 18.5 12.2 1,202
$30,001–40,000 27.9 20.5 14.9 1,253
$40,001–50,000 29.0 20.6 18.5 1,023
$50,001–75,000 33.2 23.1 21.6 1,704
More than $75,000 39.9 26.9 27.9 1,979
Parent’s education
Less than high school 20.8 15.6 11.1 665
High school degree 22.7 17.5 10.7 2,105
Vocational or some college 30.0 20.9 17.0 2,657
College degree 37.4 26.1 25.0 1,465
Graduate degree 38.6 26.0 28.8 1,660
Child’s level of schooling
Elementary school 25.4 18.3 14.8 818
Middle school 28.7 19.0 17.0 2,639
High school 32.2 23.6 20.2 4,055
Combined school 31.3 22.7 20.2 922
Source: National Household Education Survey, parent interview, 1999.shadow how the distribution of the credits would change if eﬀorts were
made to increase awareness about the credits for certain groups.
Table 3.8 examines the usage of tax credits among eligible students. Un-
fortunately, the NPSAS does not allow one to perfectly determine tax
credit eligibility, because income and net tuition information are provided
for a school year (1999–2000) while eligibility for a credit is determined by
a tax year (January to December). Given the way the variables are deﬁned,
I do not know how much of a student’s tuition expenses were actually in-
curred during 1999 as opposed to the year 2000. Furthermore, I have no in-
formation about expenses incurred during spring 1999. To set a bound on
this problem, two deﬁnitions of eligibility are utilized. The ﬁrst uses infor-
mation on family income, attendance intensity (full-time, part-time, or less
than part-time), enrollment during fall 1999, and year in college. However,
it does not exclude students according to their net tuition expenses. There-
fore, the ﬁrst deﬁnition may include students who did not have expenses
that qualiﬁed for a higher education credit during 1999, and thus the cal-
culations may overestimate the number of students eligible for a beneﬁt.
On the other hand, while some students may not have had net tuition ex-
penses during the fall 1999, it is possible that, unbeknownst in the data,
they did have expenses during spring 1999 and so did qualify for a credit.
The second deﬁnition drops individuals with zero net tuition expenses, but
as stated, this deﬁnition may exclude students who did have qualiﬁed ex-
penses during spring 1999.32
Table 3.8 displays credit usage by demographic and college group. In
general, less than one-third of eligible college students claimed either credit
during the second year of the program. There were diﬀerences in the pro-
portion that claimed a credit by background. A much larger percentage of
independent students than dependent students claimed a credit. Relatively
more female students claimed a beneﬁt than their male counterparts, and
more white students claimed credits than black, Hispanic, or Asian stu-
dents. In terms of college level, the highest take-up rates were at four-year
public or private institutions, but the percentage that claimed a credit was
still quite low.
Table 3.9 examines diﬀerences in the use of the credits using regression
analysis. Logistic models were run on diﬀerent sample of students.33 Odds
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32. The percentage of the student population eligible for a credit using the second deﬁni-
tion (excluding students with zero net tuition costs) is shown in table 3.2. While 43 percent of
undergraduates were found to be eligible for a credit under this deﬁnition, when students with
zero net tuition expenses are included, two-thirds of undergraduate students would be eli-
gible. Likewise, including students with zero net tuition expenses increases the percentage
eligible by about 23 percentage points for master’s, doctoral, and other graduate students
and 5 percentage points for graduate students in professional ﬁelds.
33. The analysis does not use the weights provided by the sample because it has been altered
by dropping the following: international students, students who did not know if they used the
credit, students not enrolled in fall 1999 (it is unclear whether they were enrolled at all during
1999 to be eligible for a credit), and those who are not eligible according to their income or at-
tendance pattern.Table 3.8 Percentage That Claimed a Higher Education Tax Credit
Dependent Independent Graduate and
All (Traditional) (Nontraditional) Professional
Students Undergraduates Undergraduates Students
Deﬁnition 1: Eligible by Income and Attendance (14,930 observations)
Whole sample 27.27 19.63 31.79 34.83
Male students 25.66 17.73 31.40 32.68
Female students 28.35 20.97 32.00 36.49
White students 28.86 21.05 34.43 35.71
Black students 21.00 12.86 23.66 30.30
Hispanic students 21.97 15.24 25.26 32.39
Asian students 23.51 15.61 29.82 30.36
Not born in the United States 23.58 17.05 24.21 28.43
Parents: high school degree 27.01 18.63 31.68 32.16
Parents: some college 27.94 21.58 32.41 38.71
Parents: college degree 27.23 18.92 33.96 35.35
Full-time students 26.22 19.50 33.38 37.36
Part-time students 31.08 20.56 30.63 36.64
Public two-year 20.83 15.68 25.12 —
Public four-year 28.51 20.63 34.12 35.69
Private four-year 28.87 20.10 36.79 34.09
Proprietary college 23.82 18.99 25.41 26.83
Deﬁnition 2: Eligible by Income, Attendance, and Positive Net Tuition (11,742 observations)
Whole sample 29.43 21.08 34.47 37.90
Male students 27.67 19.04 33.21 36.66
Female students 30.63 22.54 35.23 38.81
White students 30.73 22.18 36.77 39.01
Black students 23.81 14.29 27.12 32.21
Hispanic students 24.98 18.35 28.49 32.99
Asian students 25.77 16.67 31.00 34.31
Not born in the United States 25.36 17.93 24.91 31.43
Parents: high school degree 29.52 20.98 34.25 34.64
Parents: some college 30.43 23.53 34.84 43.59
Parents: college degree 28.95 19.46 36.37 38.96
Full-time students 28.48 20.95 36.68 41.87
Part-time students 32.71 21.78 32.36 38.47
Public two-year 23.19 17.57 28.52 —
Public four-year 30.91 22.46 37.16 38.44
Private four-year 30.76 20.82 38.85 37.75
Proprietary college 24.56 18.97 26.39 29.00
Source: 1999–2000 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey, CATI respondents.
Notes: Sample limited to students who are eligible for a tax credit based on 1999 family income and at-
tendance. Due to incomplete information on net tuition expenses for the 1999 tax year, the proportions




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ratios are displayed and should be interpreted as the multiple by which that
group was likely to claim a credit in comparison to the baseline group. Val-
ues less than 1 suggest the group was less likely to claim a credit. Speciﬁ-
cations 1 through 3 use eligibility deﬁnition 1, while speciﬁcations 4
through 6 use deﬁnition 2.
As suggested by the descriptive results, all else being equal, eligible fe-
male students and white students were more likely to claim a credit than
men or other racial groups. Usage of the credits was also higher among
families in which the heads of the household were married (the parents for
dependent students and the students themselves if they were independent).
Although results from the NHES suggest that awareness of the tax credits
increased with income and parents’ education, there is little evidence to
support this notion with the NPSAS. Dependent students with a parent
who had some college were more likely to claim the credit than those with
a parent who had a high school degree or less. However, a similar eﬀect was
not found for students who had a parent with a college degree. Likewise,
the families of undergraduate students with greater expected family con-
tributions were not more likely to claim a credit, and the families of grad-
uate students with greater expected family contributions were less likely to
claim a credit.
Given the diﬀerences that exist in who used the credit by background, in-
creases in awareness of the tax credits could aﬀect the relative distribution
of beneﬁts. For example, if minority groups who tend to be from lower-
income backgrounds were to increase their rates of usage, the overall distri-
bution picture would shift toward lower-income families. However, many
upper-income families appear not to have claimed credits they were eligible
for, and so if their awareness increases, the distribution of the credits could
relatively favor middle- and upper-income families even more in the future.
3.3.5 Summary of the Distribution of Beneﬁts
As suspected by many researchers, primarily middle-income individuals
and families claimed the education tax credits. Nearly half of the credits
claimed in 2000 were by returns with an AGI between $30,000 and $75,000,
although this group makes up only 35 percent of the eligible returns. A re-
port from the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that the cred-
its were enacted to “preserve and enhance” access for middle- and upper-
middle-income families (Stoll and Stedman 2001). Nonetheless, when the
amount in credits is compared to federal tax liability, the greatest beneﬁci-
aries are those with incomes between $10,000 and $30,000. From the num-
ber of nontaxable returns, it is also clear that many families did not have
suﬃcient tax liability to claim the full credit for which they were eligible. It
is important to note, however, that the tax credits may become more pro-
gressive with time. The income phaseout levels are deﬁned in nominal dol-
lars, and there is no provision to index the benchmarks to inﬂation or
128 Bridget Terry Longchanges in income. Therefore, greater numbers of upper-income families
will become ineligible for a tax credit with each year. Moreover, the relative
distribution may change as families from diﬀerent backgrounds become
more aware of the beneﬁt.
With the intended goal of preserving and increasing access to college in
the midst of rising costs, it is important to evaluate the eﬀects of the HTC
and LLTC on student college behavior. The next section considers whether
the tax credits had any aﬀect on college enrollment or whether the aid was
just a transfer to the middle class without an eﬀect on attendance.
3.4 Eﬀects of Tax Credits on Student Behavior
With the introduction of the HTC and LLTC, government oﬃcials ex-
pressed a desire to increase access to higher education, especially for the
ﬁrst two years. While it has been found that the tax credits help to subsidize
the educational costs of families in the middle-income brackets, the next
question is whether this support increased college attendance as intended.
The credits could aﬀect postsecondary enrollment in several ways. First,
they may encourage individuals to attend college who would not have oth-
erwise thereby increasing total enrollment. Additionally, the credits could
induce inframarginal students, those who would have attended college re-
gardless, to increase their expenditures on postsecondary education. This
could come in the form of attending a more expensive college, enrolling
full-time rather than part-time, or completing more years of education.
However, these possible eﬀects are mitigated by the ﬁndings in the previous
section that few parents are aware of the credits and that many eligible stu-
dents do not claim a beneﬁt.
Although numerous studies have examined the eﬀect of changes in ﬁ-
nancial aid policies, none of the existing literature is based on tax credits
for higher education or anything similar. Consequently, this study is
among the ﬁrst to analyze how tax credits for higher education expendi-
tures aﬀected the college enrollment decisions of individuals. This section
begins by reviewing the literature on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial aid on enroll-
ment and discussing the possible eﬀects of the tax credits on enrollment.
Then it examines some of these issues using data from the Current Popu-
lation Surveys.
3.4.1 How Do Students Respond to Financial Aid Programs?
Much of the economic literature on the determinants of college atten-
dance focuses on how price aﬀects enrollment. While theory predicts that
college demand is negatively related to the cost of education, many studies
have tested for the sign and magnitude of the eﬀect of tuition price. Leslie
and Brinkman (1989) review studies from the 1970s and 1980s and con-
clude that a $1,000 (2001 dollars) change in college costs is associated with
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studies have found similar results. Several exploit state cross-sectional dif-
ferences to estimate the eﬀect of price. Kane (1995) uses the October Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) to link individual enrollment decisions to
the mean tuition costs of a state. He ﬁnds that states with higher public tui-
tion levels had lower college entry rates and estimates a price eﬀect similar
in magnitude to that found by Leslie and Brinkman. Cameron and Heck-
man (1999) ﬁnd a slightly larger eﬀect of 6 percentage points using the
1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
College price studies based upon cross-sectional variation in state-level
tuition data are primarily identiﬁed by ﬁxed diﬀerences between states.
These estimates could be misleading because it is diﬃcult to distinguish
the impact of tuition from any other characteristic of the state that has
remained constant over time. Therefore, other work exploits changes in ﬁ-
nancial aid policy to examine the eﬀect of college costs on enrollment. Dy-
narski (2003) investigates how the elimination of the Social Security Stu-
dent Beneﬁt Program in 1982 aﬀected attendance. She ﬁnds that the
enrollment of the aﬀected group dropped by more than a third, with the
loss of $1,000 in aid translating into a decreased probability of attending
college by 3.6 percentage points. This increase in price was also found to
reduce the years of completed schooling by a tenth of a year.
The introduction of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship provides further
opportunity to exploit a natural experiment. Dynarski (2000) examines the
impact of the program on college entry for eighteen-to-nineteen-year-olds
using 1989 to 1997 data from the October CPS. She ﬁnds that the HTC pro-
gram raised college attendance rates between 7 and 8 percentage points.
This translates into a 3 percentage point impact on college enrollment for
every $1,000 (2001 dollars). Using institutional data on enrollment, Corn-
well, Mustard, and Sridhar (2001) ﬁnd slightly smaller estimates of an en-
rollment eﬀect. Likewise, Kane (2003) analyzes the eﬀect of the Cal Grant
program and ﬁnds large enrollment impacts from eligibility (4 to 6 per-
centage points). While most studies have focused on recent high school
graduates, Seftor and Turner (2002) examine the impact of college costs on
nontraditional students with the introduction of the Pell Grant in 1972.
They conclude that older individuals are more responsive to price after
ﬁnding elasticities larger than those estimated for younger students (be-
tween –0.14 and –0.34).
College prices have also been found to aﬀect choices between institu-
tions. Long (forthcoming-a) exploits extensive match-speciﬁc information
between individuals and colleges and approximates the nearly 2,800 alter-
natives available to potential students. Using the conditional logistic
choice model and controls for college expenditures, student body charac-
teristics, and distance, she estimates that an individual is 41 percent less
likely to attend a college that costs $1,000 more (2001 dollars), all else be-
130 Bridget Terry Longing equal. For her sample of students from the National Education Longi-
tudinal Study (NELS), this magnitude is enough to move the most pre-
ferred college to the ﬁfth position for the average individual. For a simula-
tion that cut the price diﬀerence between public and private colleges by
half, Long ﬁnds that up to 29 percent fewer students are predicted to at-
tend public, four-year colleges.
3.4.2 How Might the Tax Credits Aﬀect College Enrollment Behavior?
Although the estimates from the literature are helpful in understanding
the importance of price in college decisions, none are based on policies
similar to the higher education tax credits. The manner of disbursement
(through the tax code), the timing of the beneﬁts (up to ﬁfteen months
later), and the eligibility constraints of the HTC and LLTC make them en-
tirely unique. However, researchers have theorized about their possible
eﬀects on postsecondary investments.
The ﬁrst major issue is whether the tax credits increased college enroll-
ment. College access is of the greatest concern among low-income individ-
uals. In 1997, while 89 percent of high school graduates aged eighteen to
twenty-four from the top quartile of the income distribution participated in
college, only 53 percent from the bottom quartile did so (Mortenson 1999).
However, since the tax credits are nonrefundable and many low-income in-
dividuals are not eligible for the credits, many do not expect enrollment to
increase for this group (Kane 1997, 1998, 1999b; Wolanin 2001). However,
the elasticity of college attendance is likely to be reasonably high for the
middle class since they are less likely to be liquidity constrained and have a
high overall propensity to attend college. In her analysis of the Georgia
HOPE Scholarship, Dynarski (2000) found middle- and upper-income stu-
dents had the largest enrollment responses. Likewise, if nontraditional stu-
dents are especially responsive to college costs, as found by Seftor and Tur-
ner (2002), the tax credits may increase the enrollment of older students.
While commentators do not expect a substantial enrollment response,
some suggest that students may be induced to choose more costly colleges.
The reason stems from the potential price and income eﬀects created by the
tax credits. The HTC and LLTC not only reduce the price of college for re-
cipients; they also alter the marginal cost for students to increase their ex-
penditures. Before the creation of the tax credits, each additional dollar of
tuition cost the student an additional dollar. However, with the credits, an
additional dollar of expense may not cost the student anything. For ex-
ample, the marginal cost to a HTC recipient for increases in college tuition
is zero for those who pay less than $1,000. To illustrate this point, suppose
a school charged $500 in tuition. Its students would be eligible for $500 in
HTC aid and therefore would be able to attend for free. However, the same
would be true if the school increased its price to $1,000 and the cost of col-
lege net the HTC is zero until $1,000. Another way to state this is that the
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percent. The marginal tuition subsidy for HTC recipients rises to 50 per-
cent for those paying between $1,000 and $2,000. For recipients of the
LLTC, the marginal subsidy is 20 percent up to $5,000, meaning the indi-
vidual is only responsible for 80 cents for each additional dollar charged.
Because of these price eﬀects, individuals have clear incentives to attend
more expensive schools or spend more on college courses.
Additionally, the tax credits eﬀectively increase an eligible family’s col-
lege budget. As a result, those eligible for the full HTC are now able to
aﬀord $1,500 more in college expenditures, while those with the LLTC re-
ceive $1,000 more in aid. This is the income eﬀect generated by the tax cred-
its. Depending on the preferences of the individuals, all or only part of this
income gain may be spent on a more expensive school. If they are not spent
on postsecondary education, the HTC and LLTC could have a consump-
tion eﬀect. Since the tax credits do not aﬀect the marginal cost of tuition
above $5,000 for recipients of the LLTC and $2,000 for recipients of the
HTC, they may not lead to sizable increases in college expenditures by
families already spending more than $5,000 (Kane 1998). Finally, the tax
credits could prompt individuals to substitute them for other types of ﬁ-
nancial aid. For example, since the tax credits do not have to be repaid,
they may be preferred over loans.
While the tax credits could encourage enrollment, the delay between the
activity and receipt of the aid may reduce the likelihood of any eﬀect. As-
suming tuition is paid in January of one year and taxes are ﬁled in April of
the following year, it could take up to ﬁfteen months to receive a tax credit
(Conklin and Finney 1999). This makes the tax credits a distinctive form of
ﬁnancial aid, as most other programs provide support at the time of atten-
dance. Because of this disconnect, the tax credits are more likely to be used
for noneducational expenses than are other types of aid. Furthermore,
credits do not help individuals whose reason for not attending college is liq-
uidity.
3.4.3 Predictions from the Price Sensitivity Literature
Given the known responses of students to other ﬁnancial aid policies,
one may estimate the possible enrollment eﬀects of the tax credits. Using
the 1992–1993 NPSAS, Cronin (1997) calculates that the enrollment re-
sponse by 2002 could be expected to be between 150,000 and 1.4 million
additional students, with the likely response closer to the low end of the
range. However, these calculations are based on the earlier version of the
tax credit proposal, which included a tax deduction of up to $10,000 for
older students, rather than the LLTC that eventually passed.
To get an approximation of the expected eﬀect of the tax credits on at-
tendance, I use estimates found in the literature on the eﬀect of college
costs. Assuming the 4 percentage point impact per $1,000 in cost, the mean
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2.9 percentage point eﬀect. Before the enactment of the policy (fall 1997),
15.4 million students were enrolled in college (Martinez and Day 1999).
This constitutes approximately 36.9 percent of traditional-aged students
(aged 18 to 24), 11.8 percent of those aged 25 to 29, and 5.7 percent aged
30 to 34. Applying the estimated impact of a $731 credit, an additional 1.1,
0.34, and 0.17 percent of individuals aged 18 to 24, 25 to 29, and 30 to 35,
respectively, should enroll in college. This translates into 101,244 addi-
tional students aged 18 to 24, 7,500 aged 25 to 29, and 1,897 aged 30 to 34,
for a total of 110,641. Next one must take into account that not everyone
is eligible for the aid. Given that approximately two-thirds of individuals
are eligible for the credit based on 1997 tax returns, the estimated impact is
approximately 74,000 new students aged 18 to 34. The policy could have an
additional eﬀect on older students by subsidizing occasional courses.
The tax credits could also aﬀect individual choices between colleges. Be-
cause of the incentives created by the tax credits, this may especially be true
for individuals who would have attended other colleges that cost less than
$2,000 (for potential recipients of the HTC) or less than $5,000 (for poten-
tial LLTC recipients). For example, a person previously spending $500
might choose to take additional courses or attend a college that charged
$1,000. In some instances, the credits reduce the cost gap between com-
peting colleges. For example, before the credits, a $1,000 college and $3,000
college cost a diﬀerence of $2,000. However, if the person received a HTC,
then the diﬀerence would be only $1,500 (the new prices would be $0 and
$1,500, respectively). This decline in the price gap between colleges is an
additional reason some individuals choose institutions that are more ex-
pensive than they would otherwise. The College Board (2001a) estimates
that 21 percent of full-time undergraduates at four-year colleges paid less
than $2,000 in 2000–2001. This translates into approximately 1.6 million
students (NCES 2000). Applying the estimates from Long (forthcoming-
a), the reduction in the price gap between two colleges due to the tax cred-
its could cause up to 29 percent, or 464,000 students, to switch to more ex-
pensive schools. The total number is likely to be higher for part-time
students since a larger proportion of these students spend less than $2,000.
These rough calculations are based on estimates from traditional ﬁnan-
cial aid programs. However, there are important distinctions between tax
credits and other types of aid that could cause these estimates to inaccu-
rately depict the possible impact on the behavior of students. To test for ac-
tual enrollment eﬀects, the next section begins to analyze microdata from
the period.
3.4.4 Empirical Strategy
To evaluate the enrollment eﬀects of the HTC and LLTC, I use the 1990–
2000 October supplement of the CPS. The CPS is a national household sur-
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formation available on family background, I identify the individuals likely
to be eligible for a HTC or LLTC and link this to their enrollment decisions.
In order to test for a possible eﬀect, I compare how the attendance deci-
sions of those eligible for the credits changed after the policy change. For a
control group, I use individuals not eligible for the aid. This diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences analysis technique has been employed to study other ﬁnancial
aid programs, in particular with these data (see Dynarski 2000 and Kane
1995). Using logistic regression models, I estimate the following equation:
(1) Enrolli      1(TaxCrediti   Afteri)    2TaxCrediti    3Afteri   ε,
where i is the ith individual. The parameter  1 is the reduced-form enroll-
ment eﬀect of the tax credits. It measures whether individuals eligible for
the credit acted diﬀerently from others after the enactment of the aid pol-
icy. The variables “TaxCredit” and “After” are dummy variables equal to 1
if the person qualiﬁes to take either the HTC or LLTC or if the year is 1998
or after; otherwise the variables are equal to zero. Due to the fact that this
paper relies on serially correlated outcomes, the standard errors are ad-
justed using clustering methods.34 Because enrollment patterns diﬀer by
race, gender, age, and other demographics, these background characteris-
tics are controlled for in the analysis. Additionally, I use state-level infor-
mation about annual unemployment rates, per capita income, and the per-
centage of the population with a baccalaureate degree to account for
diﬀerences in economic conditions, levels of wealth, and preferences for
education across the country.
Table 3.10 displays summary statistics for the CPS sample. Means are
calculated for traditional-aged (aged eighteen to twenty-four) and nontra-
ditional-aged (aged twenty-ﬁve to forty) college students and broken down
by eligibility status. The summary statistics highlight how the eligibility cri-
teria favor families with higher income levels (but below the eligibility ceil-
ing). Moreover, individuals eligible for the credit are more likely to come
from families with married or joint tax return ﬁlers.
While the CPS provides a large, annual sample of individuals, there are
several important limitations to this data set. First, information about fam-
ily income is categorical, making it diﬃcult to deﬁne the eligibility bench-
marks exactly. This grouping also makes it impossible to put family income
in constant dollars over time. Second, the income variable is capped at
$75,000, which makes deﬁning eligibility for joint returns diﬃcult.35 For
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34. See Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2001) for a discussion of how serial correlation
aﬀects the standard errors of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation.
35. To account for this, I summed the weekly earnings of everyone in a household. If this
amount was greater than $100,000 as an annual income, the household was designated ineli-
gible. While weekly earnings information was not available for the entire sample, when com-
pared to the categorical family income variable, the amounts were similar for the upper in-
come groups.Table 3.10 Summary Statistics of the 1990–2000 October Current Population Survey
Age 18–24 (traditional college age) Age 25–40
Not Eligible Eligible for a Not Eligible Eligible for a
for Any Higher Education for Any Higher Education
Credit Tax Credit Credit Tax Credit
Percentage 41.9 58.1 24.9 75.1
Demographic characteristics
Age 21.2 21.1 32.0 33.1
(1.8) (2.0) (4.6) (4.5)
Female 53.8 51.2 53.1 51.9
Black 15.0 7.8 17.2 7.3
Asian 4.4 4.4 4.0 3.8
Hispanic 6.6 4.3 5.6 3.8
Married 18.9 17.1 31.6 75.2
Educational attainment
High school degree 46.7 35.9 48.9 35.1
Some college 42.6 51.1 29.3 31.7
Bachelor’s degree 9.3 11.7 14.8 23.5
Graduate degree 1.1 1.2 6.7 9.6
College attendance behavior
Enrolled in college 35.7 46.3 9.5 6.7
Four-year college 73.9 75.5 70.0 70.4
[14,720] [26,453] [7,048] [15,044]
Full-time 83.7 85.1 60.0 33.2
[14,720] [26,453] [7,048] [15,044]
Income and labor market 
status
Family income  4.52 10.53 5.26 10.20
(categorical) (3.37) (2.36) (4.04) (2.39)
Joint return (for parents if 
a dependent) 30.8 79.5 32.1 80.7
Single return 69.2 20.5 67.9 19.3
Employed 66.8 69.4 73.1 85.4
Unemployed 7.9 4.8 6.6 2.1
Out of labor force 24.2 25.1 19.7 11.3
Potential education tax credit 
beneﬁt
Maximum higher educa- 0 914 0 851
tion credit (333) (229)
Credit at a state public  0 796 0 781
two-year (333) (273)
No. of observations 41,220 57,074 73,952 222,889
Source: October CPS data 1990–2000.
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. If the full sample was not used in calculating a
mean, the number of observations is noted in brackets. The percentages of the sample that are attend-
ing four-year colleges or are full-time were calculated conditional on enrollment in college.these reasons, some families are incorrectly being counted as eligible for a
tax credit when their exact income would disqualify them. This measure-
ment error is likely to attenuate the results. In addition, as shown in table
3.10, among the individuals who are enrolled in college, a greater propor-
tion are in four-year colleges (as opposed to two-year colleges) and attend
full-time (rather than part-time) than is found in the nation. This suggests
that the college-going sample is not nationally representative. More im-
portant, this may imply that the data set does not accurately capture all stu-
dents in the two-year college system and those that attend part-time. As a
result, the analysis may not detect changes in enrollment at these types of
schools or part-time attendance. Finally, parental income is only available
for young adults that appear on their parents’ CPS record. This will occur
if the individual lives at home or is away at college. Therefore, the proba-
bility that a young person will have accurate family income information is
a function of his or her propensity to attend college.
3.4.5 Analysis of the Enrollment Eﬀects
To discern whether the tax credits had an eﬀect on college enrollment, I
test for three possible responses. First, did the likelihood of attending col-
lege increase for individuals eligible for a credit? This is a test of the cred-
its’ impact on general postsecondary access. Second, did the proportion of
college students who were enrolled at four-year colleges increase? This is a
way to examine whether students were induced to spend more on higher
education after the creation of the credits. And third, did the percentage of
college attendants that were full-time rather than part-time students in-
crease? To measure eligibility, I alternate between three diﬀerent measures:
(1) eligibility for any credit; (2) the monetary amount of the maximum
credit for which a person qualiﬁes; and (3) the amount of the credit avail-
able if the person paid the mean cost of his or her state’s public two-year
colleges. The third deﬁnition is an approximation of what a marginal stu-
dent who decides to attend a community college would receive. Since the
credits diﬀer in their target groups and generosity, I examine the behavior
of several age groups. Younger students (aged eighteen and nineteen) are
more likely to be aﬀected by the HTC while older students are eligible for
the LLTC.
The following analysis reports the results as odds ratios so that values
less than 1 should be interpreted as having a negative relationship with
the dependent variable. The coeﬃcient of interest is  1, which measures
whether enrollment behavior changed for the group eligible for the credit
after the introduction of the program (TaxCrediti   Afteri). Several of the
models exclude from the sample three states with large ﬁnancial aid pro-
grams that preclude many students from receiving the tax credit (Georgia,
Florida, and New Mexico). Each state has a scholarship program that cov-
ers full tuition at public colleges within the state for many students. In this
136 Bridget Terry Longcircumstance, students would not be eligible to receive any additional aid
from the federal government.
Table 3.11 displays estimates of the tax credit eﬀect on the propensity to
enroll in college. For panel A, I use whether an individual qualiﬁes for any
credit as the measure of eligibility. Overall, I estimate that individuals eli-
gible for the credit are more likely to attend college, but generally, there is
no diﬀerential increase in enrollment after the introduction of the tax cred-
its. Panel B investigates if there is any eﬀect on the enrollment decisions of
individuals using the maximum monetary amount a student is eligible for
based on credit criteria (in thousands of dollars). Similar to above results
the estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant. The results are the same when
deﬁning eligibility using the mean tuition cost of public two-year colleges
in the state of residence (panel C).
These results are robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of college-going behav-
ior (the inclusion or exclusion of those taking vocational courses; using re-
spondents who answered college-related questions but signiﬁed earlier in
the survey that they were not in higher education). Furthermore, the re-
sults are robust to other speciﬁcations. The models were reestimated limit-
ing the sample to individuals without a college degree, and no enrollment
eﬀect was found. Likewise, when the sample is limited to 1995 to 2000 so
that estimation is based on three years prior to the policy change and three
years after, the results remain statistically insigniﬁcant.
Rather than aﬀecting access, the tax credits may encourage individuals
to buy more education. To test this proposition, table 3.12 tests how the
likelihood of attending a four-year institution, conditional on attending
any college, is aﬀected by the policy change. If the tax credits encouraged
students to attend more expensive colleges, then one would expect for the
proportion of students at four-year colleges to increase. However, similar
to the foregoing results, none of the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.36
The same is true when testing whether the HTC and LLTC aﬀected
whether a person attended college full-time rather than part-time. Al-
though one would expect a positive eﬀect if the credits encouraged indi-
viduals to spend more on college, no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is found
after the introduction of the credits as shown in table 3.13.
3.4.6 Conclusions on the Enrollment Eﬀect
In summary, although the tax credits were promoted as a means of in-
creasing college access, this analysis found no enrollment response. Dur-
ing the three years after policy enactment, general enrollment did not ap-
pear to increase, nor did the proportion of students that attended four-year
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36. Similarly, a multinomial logistic model using three options (not enrolled in college; en-
rolled in a two-year college; and enrolled in a four-year college) ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁ-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.institutions or were full-time. The lack of ﬁnding a substantial response in
student enrollment conforms to many of the forecasts by researchers and
critics. The principal beneﬁciaries of the tax credits are not likely to be mar-
ginal students, and the disconnect between the aid and college attendance
is likely to limit the eﬀect of the credits on enrollment. Furthermore, if col-
leges raised tuition in response to the tax credits (this question is examined
in the next section), this may help to explain why there was little enrollment
eﬀect. Finally, with the low take-up rates illustrated in table 3.8, not enough
families may know about the beneﬁt for it to have a discernible impact on
enrollment.
However, the October CPS has several serious limitations for this type of
analysis. Due to the categorical deﬁnitions of family income, particularly
at the higher income levels, it is likely that some students were mislabeled
since the data do not allow one to distinguish incomes above $75,000.
Moreover, assumptions had to be made about dependent versus indepen-
dent student status based on age and single versus joint ﬁling status based
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Table 3.13 The Likelihood of Attending Full-Time Conditional on Enrollment (odds
ratios reported)
Traditional College Students 
Age of Traditional 
College Students
(excluding full-tuition programs)
Age 18–19 Age 18–24
Age 18–19 Age 18–24 (no GA, FL, NM) (no GA, FL, NM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Variable of Interest: Eligible for Any Credit
After 1.1694 0.9345 1.1435 0.9061
(1.01) (0.95) (0.81) (1.35)
Eligible for any credit? 1.0219 0.9635 1.0395 0.9643
(0.19) (0.63) (0.31) (0.58)
After   any credit 0.8954 0.9908 0.9148 0.9989
(0.83) (0.12) (0.63) (0.01)
No. of observations 15,016 41,173 14,150 38,665
R2 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15
B. Variable of Interest: Monetary Amount of the Maximum Credit Eligible (thousands)
After 1.0440 0.9320 1.0310 0.9032
(0.30) (1.07) (0.19) (1.52)
Maximum credit 0.8970 0.9215∗ 0.9084 0.9254∗
(1.50) (1.88) (1.23) (1.67)
After   max credit 1.0420 0.9976 1.0535 1.0084
(0.41) (0.04) (0.50) (0.13)
No. of observations 15,016 41,173 14,150 38,665
R2 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15
Source: October CPS data 1990–2000.
Notes: See table 3.11.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.on family type. For these reasons, eligibility is most certainly measured
with error, and some individuals were probably labeled as eligible when in
actuality they were not, and vice versa. As a result, the results suﬀer from
attenuation bias. Furthermore, the CPS may not adequately capture col-
lege enrollment at two-year colleges or students who attend part-time.
Therefore, if the credits had an eﬀect on these groups, it may not be dis-
cernible from these data.
Further analysis of these issues using more detailed data sets is necessary
before we can be more conﬁdent of the results. Beyond better income in-
formation, it would also be useful to have more data on college enrollment
behavior. For example, knowing how many credit hours a person com-
pleted would help answer questions about the intensity of enrollment. In-
formation on which institution the individual attended and the receipt of
other ﬁnancial aid would help researchers to understand how the tax cred-
its inﬂuence college choices and the possible substitution of the credits for
other types of aid. A panel data set would allow one to observe how these
factors changed after the introduction of the credits for students already in
college. In addition, longitudinal data would allow one to track how stu-
dents’ decisions change after transforming from being eligible for the HTC
(the ﬁrst two years of college) to instead qualifying for the LLTC. Addi-
tional questions exist on a possible consumption eﬀect, but further infor-
mation on family income and expenditures is necessary for this analysis. It
is also worth noting that it may be too soon to witness an enrollment eﬀect.
As take-up rates for the tax credits increase, more individuals may be in-
ﬂuenced by the support in ways discernible by quantitative research.
3.5 The Impact of the Tax Credits on College Pricing
While most of the literature on the impact of ﬁnancial aid policy focuses
on the reactions of individuals, researchers have long theorized that the
policies may also aﬀect the behavior of postsecondary institutions. Most
notably, William Bennett surmised in a 1987 article in the New York Times
that the rise in college tuition prices was due to increases in the availability
of government ﬁnancial aid.37With the creation of the higher education tax
credits, the Department of Education seemed to be aware of this possibil-
ity in the form of reduced institutional aid. In a letter to college presidents,
Secretary Richard Riley asked that the tax credits not serve as a “substitute
for existing sources of ﬁnancial assistance” (Riley 1998).
Researchers have tested the Bennett hypothesis by examining whether
increases in aid translate into increases in tuition prices. McPherson and
142 Bridget Terry Long
37. From 1975–1976 to 1985–1986, the mean public four-year tuition increased 55.1 per-
cent in real terms (after accounting for inﬂation). Private four-year tuition levels increased
37.3 percent (College Board 2001a).Schapiro (1991) use annual institutional data to relate changes in the Pell
Grant to institutional behavior. They ﬁnd that increases in government aid
are coupled with increases in institutional scholarship spending at private
colleges, contrary to the predictions of Bennett. In contrast, Li (1999) ﬁnds
some support for the Bennett hypothesis when she uses the master ﬁles of
the Pell Grant Information System to track Pell recipients and the tuition
levels of their respective colleges. One possible reason for these conﬂicting
results stems from the diﬃculty in isolating the eﬀect of government aid on
tuition pricing from other factors. It is unclear whether changes in tuition
are due to changes in aid or other general trends in higher education. Long
(forthcoming-b) is able to circumvent the issue by examining the eﬀect of
the Georgia HOPE Scholarship on in-state institutions. She ﬁnds that most
four-year colleges in Georgia did experience relative increases in net price.
While public institutions increased room and board fees, private colleges
raised list tuition price and reduced institutional aid. The net eﬀect was to
increase costs to students by as much as $0.30 for each dollar of aid. This
highlights the importance of the design of a program in ensuring that stu-
dents, rather than institutions, realize the full beneﬁt and that students who
do not receive the aid are not unintentionally negatively aﬀected. This sec-
tion exploits variation in the incentives created by the introduction of the
tax credits to examine their eﬀects on states and institutions.
3.5.1 How Might the Tax Credits Aﬀect Postsecondary Institutions?
Due to the price and income eﬀects created by the tax credits, colleges
may have the incentive to increase their prices up to the amount of the aid.
The strongest incentives are for colleges that charge tuition below $1,000.
As described in the previous section, the marginal cost to a student of a col-
lege charging below this amount is zero. For example, if a school charges
$500 in tuition, its ﬁrst- and second-year students would be eligible for
$500 in tax credits and therefore would be able to attend for free. However,
the same would be true if the school increased its price to $1,000. With the
HTC the marginal tuition subsidy is between 50 and 100 percent for insti-
tutions charging less than $2,000. It is an additional 20 percent for students
past the second year at institutions charging less than $5,000 due to the
LLTC.
Another possible institutional reaction to the tax credits could be to re-
label room and board charges and other fees as tuition charges because the
former do not constitute “qualiﬁed” expenses (Kane 1999a). For instance,
a college with tuition of $1,000 and room and board charges of $4,000
might be induced to raise the tuition price to $2,000 and lower the room
and board charge to $3,000.
Increases in college costs may ultimately stem from action taken by state
governments. States are likely to view the increase in federal aid as an op-
portunity to reduce their support for higher education in the form of ap-
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centives are strongest for states that heavily subsidize public tuition levels
to below $2,000. As Kane (1999b) notes, “To not do so would mean forgo-
ing rather generous new federal subsidies for state taxpayers” (148). While
price increases might understandably aﬀect a college’s standing relative to
competing institutions, state governments are best able to prevent a loss of
students. This is because they are able to coordinate the price increases of
a large set of colleges. Together with the fact that public colleges are already
far less expensive than private schools, individual public colleges face little
risk of losing students. However, such price increases may deter students
from enrolling in college at all if the tax credits are not perceived by stu-
dents to oﬀset the additional costs. This is an especially troublesome
prospect for students ineligible for the aid due to lack of tax liability.
The incentive to raise tuition prices is also strong for states with large
ﬁnancial aid programs. Since eligibility is based on tuition expenses net
grants and scholarships, residents in states with generous programs may
not qualify for the full tax credit due to receiving state support. In this case,
the eligibility of residents would increase as tuition was increased. State
and institutional aid would also be aﬀected if colleges and states perceive
the credits as substitutes for other types of aid. This reaction was found in
an examination of the institutional impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholar-
ship on institutional aid awards at private colleges in Georgia (Long, forth-
coming-b).
In fact, many states did react to the introduction of the tax credits by
considering ways to capture the federal resources available through the
new tax credits. In a report from California’s Legislative Analyst’s Oﬃce,
Turnage (1998) notes that the credits “create opportunities to increase the
eﬀective federal subsidy of California’s higher education programs.” He ar-
gues that due to California’s low-cost community colleges, many other
states will have higher per-student subsidies (estimated to be $360 in Cali-
fornia but $1,250 in other states): “Due to interactions between the credits
and recent state fee reductions, the state is unintentionally sending monies
intended for students back to the federal government.” Furthermore, by re-
ducing the price diﬀerential between the state’s community colleges, Cali-
fornia State University system, and the UC system, Turnage suggests that
HTC could “unintentionally shift enrollment away from our community
colleges to the universities, at potentially great cost to the state and at cross
purposes to the state’s higher education master plan.” For these reasons,
Turnage suggests increasing fees at public colleges in California. He asserts
that the tax credits would oﬀset the increase for richer students while ﬁ-
nancial aid could be given to oﬀset the eﬀect for low-income students. Ac-
cording to his calculations, an increase from $360 to $1,000 at the commu-
nity colleges would increase funding to these schools by over $100 million
annually without aﬀecting the California state budget.
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the tax credits. Budget analysis by the Arkansas legislature recommended
that the state reconsider its tuition policies in light of the tax credits. Min-
nesota, North Carolina, and Washington took similar actions to consider
how to devise state ﬁnancial aid programs while taking into account the
HTC support. Another example is New York, which provides need-based
aid through its Tuition Assistance Program. Under this program, New
York families with a student in a four-year public college would not be eli-
gible for the maximum HTC unless their taxable income is $45,000 or
higher. In comparison, most families would be eligible for the full credit if
their taxable income is at least $30,000. As a result, the New York State
Higher Education Services Corporation recommended studying whether
federal funds could be substituted for state funds (New York State Higher
Education Services Corporation 1998).
If colleges do raise their prices in response to the policy, the tax credit
could become a transfer from the federal government to schools and state
governments rather than to families. However, some question whether
postsecondary institutions would respond to the introduction of the tax
credits. Since the strongest incentives to raise tuition prices are for com-
munity colleges (i.e., schools with lower tuition levels), and these schools
predominantly serve low-income populations not eligible for the tax credit,
some suggest that tuition inﬂation is an unlikely response to the credits
(Kane 1999a; Cronin 1997).
The HTC and LLTC could aﬀect postsecondary institutions in ways
other than pricing. The tax credits may give institutions the incentive to
ﬁnd ways to grant half-time degree credit to middle-income taxpayers
(Kane 1999a; Cronin 1997). One possibility is for colleges to create leisure-
oriented courses for college credit that would attract taxpayers eligible for
the tax credits. For example, colleges could oﬀer $1,000 whale-watching
tours with no cost to HTC-eligible students as long as participants receive
half-time credit toward a degree (Kane 1999a). This potential abuse mir-
rors issues raised with the Pell Grant program; however, the risk may be
greater given the larger number of eligible aid recipients.
Distributing aid through the tax system also creates a number of expen-
sive regulatory requirements for colleges and universities. Higher educa-
tion institutions must supply the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with the
names, addresses, and Social Security numbers of all of their students as
well as indicating whether the students are enrolled at least half-time, a
stipulation of eligibility for the HTC. Additional requirements may be im-
posed to include information on those who claim a student as a dependent
for federal income tax purposes and who may claim HTC (Wolanin 2001).
The National Association of College and University Business Oﬃcers
(NACUBO) estimated that compliance with this full set of requirements
would have cost institutions $137 million in 1999 (NACUBO 1998). Fur-
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to produce needed information is 2.4 million hours (IRS 2000). For tax
year 1999, the UC system alone spent nearly $1 million to provide its
371,000 students with Form 1098, the tuition payment statement necessary
to claim a tax credit (Hoblitzell and Smith 2001). These costs of compli-
ance are an additional reason colleges might increase tuition prices.
3.5.2 Empirical Strategy
The incentives created by the introduction of the HTC and LLTC are
predicted to aﬀect states and colleges in three ways. First, based on the as-
sumption that the intensity of the treatment should aﬀect the magnitude of
the response, one would expect to ﬁnd that colleges with greater numbers
of eligible students responded more dramatically to the introduction of the
tax credits than colleges with fewer eligible students. Second, although all
colleges may have incentives to raise prices due to the introduction of the
tax credits, colleges with lower tuition rates should experience relatively
larger increases in price due to the lower marginal cost to students. Table
3.14 displays how colleges with diﬀerent tuition rates are distributed geo-
graphically since state support for higher education varies across region. It
is important to note that a comparison of public colleges that charged less
than $2,000 in 1997 to those that charged more reﬂects the diﬀerences in
the state policies of colleges in the Southeast, far West, and Southwest re-
gions from the policies of those in Mideast and Great Lakes regions.38
A third prediction is that public colleges in states with substantial aid
programs should experience decreases in state support and larger increases
in price. Table 3.15separates colleges into two groups based on the amount
of grant aid awarded by states during the 1997–1998 school year. States are
considered to have large aid programs if they are in the top eight in terms
of total money spent or the amount per student.39The states with large aid
programs prior to the policy change were New York, Illinois, California,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Minnesota, Georgia, Florida, New Mex-
ico, and Vermont. Table 3.15 also displays how colleges within these states
are distributed by tuition level.
To test for these possible eﬀects, I examine how state support for higher
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38. The regions are New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT), Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ,
NY, PA), Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), South-
east (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV), Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX),
Rocky Mountains (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY), and far West (AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, WA).
39. The benchmark of “top eight” was chosen due to the natural break in the amounts of
the next highest states. The next highest state in total amount was North Carolina, with $105
million (compared to Florida, which was $135 million). The next highest state in per-student
expenditures was Indiana, with $292.50 (compare to $342 for Vermont). Georgia, Florida,
and New Mexico are excluded because each has large aid programs that cover full tuition for
a signiﬁcant proportion of students. These states, therefore, do not have the incentive to raise
tuition prices as they would have to pay for the increase out of their own aid programs.education and college tuition levels have evolved over time by noting the
policy change between the 1997–1998 and 1998–1999 school years.40 I an-
alyze whether the introduction of the HTC and LLTC caused discontinu-
ities among the states and colleges most aﬀected by the policy or with the
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Table 3.14 The Distribution of Colleges by Region and Prepolicy List Tuition Level
Incentives Due to Price  Incentives Due to 
and Income Eﬀects Income Eﬀects
 $1,000 $1,001–2,000 $2,001–5,000 $5,001–7,500 $7,500 
Public two-year 
colleges
New England — 6 20 1 —
Mideast — 6 80 — —
Great Lakes — 11 85 9 —
Plains 1 37 27 — —
Southeast 85 143 1 — —
Southwest 34 52 9 — —
Rocky Mountains — 29 2 — —
Far West 50 42 — — —
Total 170 326 224 10 —
Public four-year 
colleges
New England — 1 28 4 1
Mideast — — 65 25 1
Great Lakes — — 72 2 —
Plains — 4 47 — —
Southeast — 32 107 3 —
Southwest — 24 29 — —
Rocky Mountains — 8 19 — —
Far West — 18 31 — —
Total — 87 398 34 2
Private four-year 
colleges
Total — — 44 90 735
Source: IPEDS data.
Notes: Tuition levels are for in-state students. The regions are New England (CT, ME, MA,
NH, RI, VT), Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA), Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI), Plains
(IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD), Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN,
VA, WV), Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX), Rocky Mountains (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY), and far
West (AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, WA). Dashes indicate that no colleges in the region meet crite-
rion of column.
40. Although the law was passed in 1997, it was not signed until August 1997, a time when
tuition rates for the 1997–1998 school year were already set. This notion is supported by the
timing of state reports in reaction to the credits (e.g., the New York State Higher Education
Services Corporation preliminary report is dated March 1998). Furthermore, individuals
were only able to claim the credits for higher education expenses incurred after January 1,
1998, for the HOPE and after July 1, 1998, for the LLTC.strongest incentives to alter their behavior. To account for any general
trends that have aﬀected all states and universities, I use colleges in diﬀer-
ent tuition categories as a control group. The diﬀerence between the groups
is considered the eﬀect of the tax credits.41Using ordinary least squares es-
timation, this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences calculation can be made:
(2) yi     1(Afteri)    2(TargetGroupi)    3(TargetGroupi Afteri)  εi,
where i is the ith college and y is either state support for higher education
or list college price. While the ﬁrst two  s measure general diﬀerences in the
dependent variable after the policy change and among the target group, the
parameter  3 is the reduced-form eﬀect of the tax credits: It measures
whether colleges with greater incentives to lower state appropriations or
raise tuition price acted diﬀerently from other schools after the introduc-
tion of the aid policy. The variable “TargetGroup” is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the college is part of a collection of schools with strong incen-
tives to react to the tax credits. Three groups are examined to match the
predictions I have outlined: (1) colleges with many credit-eligible students;
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Table 3.15 The Distribution of Colleges by Size of State Aid Program
States with Large Aid Programs  States without Large 
(have incentives to raise tuition) Aid Programs
Public 4-Year Public 2-Year Public 4-Year Public 2-Year
 $1,000 0 40 0 130
$1,001–2,000 15 5 72 321
$2,001–5,000 111 138 287 86
$5,001–7,500 25 10 9 0
 $7,500 2000
Total 153 193 368 537
Source: National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP)
Twenty-ninth Annual Survey, IPEDS data, and the National Center for Education Statistics.
Notes: High state aid is deﬁned as being ranked as one of the top eight states in 1997–1998 in
total grant aid or per student aid. However, Georgia, Florida, and New Mexico are excluded
because they have large aid programs that cover full tuition for a signiﬁcant proportion of
their students (these states do not have incentives to raise tuition prices, as they would have
to pay for them out of their own aid program). The states with large aid programs in terms of
total expenditures are New York, Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Florida. The states with large aid programs in terms of per-student expenditures
are Georgia, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Minnesota, and
Vermont. These benchmarks were chosen due to the natural break in the amounts of the next
highest states.
41. In order for the tax credits to be used as an appropriate natural experiment, it must be
an exogenous policy. Stated another way, if the tax credits were created in response to the
power and preferences of states or postsecondary institutions, the measured responses could
reﬂect some endogenous eﬀect. However, given the reaction of many states and institutions,
there is little concern that the reactions of the colleges might be biased in some way.(2) low-cost colleges for which tuition increases have a low marginal cost;
and (3) colleges located in states with large ﬁnancial aid programs. “After”
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the year is 1998 or after. Otherwise the
dummy variables are equal to zero. Due to the fact that this paper relies on
serially correlated outcomes, the standard errors are adjusted using clus-
tering methods.42 The following results are in logs so that the results may
be interpreted as percentages.
While the models test whether colleges with a greater proportion of
credit-eligible students experience larger responses, this variable can also
be interacted with the other groups of interest. For example, when testing
whether lower-cost colleges increased their tuition levels faster than more
expensive colleges, it is also relevant to know if lower-cost colleges with
greater numbers of credit-eligible students reacted more strongly than
similarly priced colleges with fewer potential recipients. To test for this pos-
sibility, the analysis employs a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
(DDD) technique to distinguish the reactions of colleges by the intensity
of the treatment. The DDD calculation is made:
(3) yi     1(Afteri)    2(LowTuitioni)    3(LowTuitioni Afteri) 
   4(ManyEligiblei)    5(ManyEligiblei Afteri) 
   6(ManyEligiblei LowTuitioni) 
   7(LowTuitioni Afteri ManyEligiblei)  εi,
where “ManyEligible” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the college has a
large proportion of its student body eligible for a tax credit. The parame-
ter  7 is the diﬀerential eﬀect of the tax credits on low-cost colleges with
and without many potential credit recipients.
Since institutions in the diﬀerent target groups (i.e., ones with large and
small proportions of credit-eligible students; colleges with high and low tu-
ition levels) are likely to be diﬀerent in ways that might aﬀect tuition pric-
ing and trends, other control variables are included. First, the market seg-
ment of the college and its likely competitors could aﬀect its pricing and
expenditures. The most selective colleges oﬀer more institutional ﬁnancial
aid and spend more on instruction than less selective schools, and each
group faces diﬀerent competitive pressures from other institutions. For
this reason, the models take into consideration the selectivity level of the
college. Second, the preferences, wealth, and economic conditions of a
particular state are likely to aﬀect the general oﬀerings and prices of col-
leges within the state. To account for these factors, the analysis controls for
state characteristics such as annual per capita income, the percentage of
the population with a bachelor’s degree in 1999, and the annual unem-
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42. See Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2001) for a discussion of how serial correlation
aﬀects the standard errors of diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimation.ployment rate. Controls for region are also included. Finally, the amount
of state support awarded by the state legislature is highly inﬂuential in the
pricing decisions of public colleges and universities, particularly in terms
of tuition price.43 Therefore, the models that examine tuition trends also
control for the annual amount of state appropriations per student at each
school.
The data for this analysis come from several sources. First, the Inte-
grated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provides the nec-
essary institutional detail. This data set documents extensive information
on postsecondary institutions within the United States including revenue
sources (e.g., state appropriations), list tuition price, and enrollment ﬁg-
ures. In order to capture the 1998 inception of the tax credits, I use IPEDS
data from the 1993–1994 school year to the 1999–2000 school year (the
most recent year institutional ﬁnancial data are available).44 All ﬁgures
were inﬂated to 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Ur-
ban Consumers (CPI-U). A second source, Barron’s Proﬁles of American
Colleges, provides selectivity groupings for institutions based on student
body grades and test scores as well as admission policies. Data on state
characteristics such as the annual unemployment rate, per capita income,
and the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree were taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consid-
erable eﬀort was made to have a complete and balanced panel of data. To
avoid estimating results driven by yearly ﬂuctuations in composition of the
sample rather than a true eﬀect, I imposed a restriction that at least six of
the seven possible years of data had to be available for each institution.
To measure the proportion of credit-eligible students, I ﬁrst determined
the number of needy, ineligible students using information about the mean
Pell Grant at each institution (total Pell Grant awards divided by full-time
equivalent [FTE] enrollment). Since Pell Grant awards are partly deter-
mined by the cost of school attended, this mean was divided by the list tu-
ition price of the institution, and therefore the measure should be consid-
ered as the percentage of college expenses covered by the mean Pell Grant.
Using this measure, colleges with a larger percentage are assumed to have
fewer credit-eligible students. Note, however, that a simple comparison of
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43. The correlation between the mean tuition cost of four-year public colleges and the mean
amount of state appropriations received by such schools was –0.7 from 1977 to 1997 (NCES
data). In practice, schools are generally discouraged by legislatures from increasing the tu-
ition above a certain percentage each year. However, substantial increases are allowed when
state appropriations are reduced, thereby implicitly linking the subsidy and tuition level.
44. This time span is used for several reasons. First, other diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences studies
have used similar series of data to study the eﬀects of a ﬁnancial aid policy. Both Hansen’s
(1983) and Kane’s (1996) before-and-after Pell studies use three years of data before the pol-
icy change and four years after. Furthermore, this time span reﬂects the American economic
expansion of the 1990s and is less likely to be tainted by nationwide business cycles than a
longer series of data. Finally, using this time span maximizes the number of institutions that
can be used as a constant sample.colleges with and without many potential credit beneﬁciaries is really a
comparison of public two-year colleges to four-year institutions due to en-
rollment patterns by income. Low-income students, who are not eligible
for a tax credit, are more likely to attend public, two-year colleges, while
middle-income students, who are eligible for a credit, often attend public
or private four-year schools. Since these types of schools diﬀer in impor-
tant ways, a comparison of their pricing trends is not truly informative of
the institutional eﬀect of the tax credits. To avoid this complication, col-
leges were deﬁned as having many eligible students if they were in the top
half of the distribution (having a lower percentage of college expenses cov-
ered by the mean Pell Grant) for their type of school (public, two-year;
public, four-year; or private, four-year).
3.5.3 The Eﬀect on State Support for Higher Education
The introduction of the HTC and LLTC gave states the opportunity to
reduce their support for higher education in order to capture some of the
rents of the program. While all states had incentives to reduce appropria-
tions because the credits increased student incomes, table 3.16 displays re-
sults that compare states with stronger incentives to change their behavior
to those with weaker incentives. The coeﬃcients of interest ( 3) measure
the percentage by which each group had either faster or slower relative
growth after the tax credits were introduced. All models include controls
for year ﬁxed eﬀects, college selectivity, state characteristics, and region.
The ﬁrst model tests the notion that states had greater incentives to re-
duce appropriations at colleges with more credit-eligible students. How-
ever, the positive coeﬃcient suggests this was not the case at public two-
year colleges. In general, colleges with fewer Pell recipients (a proxy for
many credit-eligible students) were no more likely to experience reductions
in state appropriations and may have experienced increases in state sup-
port. However, the colleges with lower tuition prices did experience larger
reductions in state appropriations after 1997 (speciﬁcation 2). All else be-
ing equal, public two-year colleges that charged less than $1,000 experi-
enced a 57 percent reduction in state appropriations per student relative to
colleges that cost more than $2,000. The decrease was even larger for col-
leges that charged between $1,000 and $2,000 before the policy change.
Among these schools, the reductions were largest at colleges with more
credit-eligible students, conforming to the predictions of theory (speciﬁca-
tion 3). No similar pattern is found among public four-year colleges; the re-
sults are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Given the geographic distribution of public colleges, these results reﬂect
the actions of colleges in the Southeast and far West relative to colleges in
the Mideast and Great Lakes regions. For this reason, these results may be
partly driven by diﬀerences across regions, and it is therefore necessary to
also examine trends within regions. Unfortunately, sample size precludes
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Table 3.16 The State Response to the Tax Credits by Tuition Price of Colleges
(dependent variable: log of state support for higher education)
Public Two-Year Colleges Public Four-Year Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After –2.5596∗∗ –1.8011∗∗ –2.9293∗∗ –0.0335 –0.0419 –0.0487
(0.1292) (0.1618) (0.5829) (0.0548) (0.0459) (0.0646)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible  –0.3527∗∗ –0.3843∗∗ 0.1466∗∗ 0.1423∗∗
students (0.0620) (0.1397) (0.0456) (0.0492)
After   many credit- 0.4042∗∗ 1.3299∗∗ –0.0685 –0.0570
eligible (0.1599) (0.5984) (0.0608) (0.0721)
Low-Tuition (incentives to reduce support due to student beneﬁt)
Tuition  $1,000 0.2848∗∗ –0.1007
(0.1365) (0.1852)
After   tuition  $1,000 –0.5685∗∗ 0.5702
(0.2139) (0.6019)
Tuition $1,001–2,000 0.2307∗ –0.0688 –0.0580 –0.0224
(0.1189) (0.1775) (0.0550) (0.0588)
After   tuition $1,001– –0.9621∗∗ 0.2343 0.0655 0.0485
2,000 (0.1829) (0.5971) (0.0780) (0.0979)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and low-tuition)
Tuition  $1,000   many 0.1708
eligible (0.1505)
After    $1,000   many –1.5105∗∗
eligible (0.6393)
$1,001–2,000   many 0.4038∗∗ –0.0492
eligible (0.1834) (0.1397)
After   $1–2,000   many –2.6826∗∗ 0.1014
eligible (0.8102) (0.1102)
No. of colleges 705 730 705 513 521 513
No. of observations 4,935 5,110 4,935 3,591 3,647 3,591
R2 0.1748 0.1805 0.1867 0.0594 0.0514 0.0596
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary amounts are in 2000 dollars. All
models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for college selectivity, the region of the college, and state
characteristics (annual unemployment rate, annual per capita income, and 1990 percentage of the pop-
ulation with a bachelor’s degree). State support for higher education is measured by state appropriations
to a college divided by FTE enrollment. Tuition groups are deﬁned based on tuition levels during
1997–1998.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
repeating the analysis within most regions except for the Southeast, South-
west, and far West regions. Each has enough colleges distributed by tuition
level, and table 3.17presents the results. Because public two-year and four-
year colleges are now being grouped together, the models also include a
dummy variable that picks up general diﬀerences between the levels ofschools. No diﬀerences are found between schools with fewer or greater
numbers of credit-eligible students. However, in each case, the models sug-
gest that state appropriations did fall substantially at lower-cost colleges,
with the steepest reductions in the Southwest. Moreover, the reductions
were larger for the colleges priced less than $1,000 in comparison to col-
leges that cost between $1,000 and $2,000, in compliance with the predic-
tions of theory. In summary, it appears that states did in fact lower state ap-
propriations at colleges in which students faced the lowest marginal cost
due to prepolicy tuition levels.
Table 3.18 investigates whether states with large ﬁnancial aid programs
also reduced their support for higher education in response to the intro-
duction of the tax credits. In contrast to the previous results, state appro-
priations to public two-year colleges in high-aid states increased after 1997
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Table 3.17 The State Response to the Tax Credits by Region 
(dependent variable: log of state support for higher education)
Southeast Region Southwest Region Far West Region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After –1.2577∗∗ –0.2895∗∗ –2.9170∗∗ –1.4928∗∗ –1.2591∗∗ –0.4104∗∗
(0.1403) (0.0995) (0.2610) (0.3029) (0.2101) (0.1400)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible  –0.0561 –0.1386 0.2066∗
students (0.0649) (0.1082) (0.1129)
After   many credit- 0.0591 –0.2909 –0.2469
eligible (0.2184) (0.4157) (0.2880)
Low-Tuition (incentives to raise tuition due to price and income eﬀects)
Tuition  $1,000 0.6796∗∗ 0.9250∗∗ –0.3925∗
(0.1034) (0.1496) (0.2024)
After   tuition  $1,000 –1.3968∗∗ –2.4325∗∗ –1.3923∗∗
(0.2267) (0.3751) (0.2678)
Tuition $1,001–2,000 0.4024∗∗ 0.7820∗∗ 0.0641
(0.0960) (0.1362) (0.1312)
After   tuition $1,001– –1.2669∗∗ –1.6312∗∗ –1.1585∗∗
2,000 (0.1659) (0.3367) (0.2248)
No. of colleges 365 371 139 148 133 141
No. of observations 2,555 2,597 973 1,036 931 987
R2 0.1327 0.1567 0.3093 0.3391 0.2564 0.2874
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary amounts are in 2000 dollars. All
models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for college selectivity and state characteristics (annual un-
employment rate, annual per capita income, and 1990 percentage of the population with a bachelor’s de-
gree). State support for higher education is measured by state appropriations to a college divided by FTE
enrollment. Tuition groups are deﬁned based on tuition levels during 1997–1998.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.contrary to the incentives created (speciﬁcation 1). These colleges experi-
enced one and a half times the growth in appropriations of colleges in low-
aid states. In fact, two-year public colleges with more credit-eligible stu-
dents had larger increases than similar schools with fewer potential
recipients (speciﬁcation 2). This counterintuitive pattern illustrates the
wide variance in state policies toward public postsecondary institutions.
While some states seemed to have responded to the tax credits by shifting
state appropriations at public two-year colleges in directions that would
maximize the ability to capture federal funds, others that already had a
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Table 3.18 The State Response to the Tax Credits by Size of State Aid Program
(dependent variable: log of state support for higher education)
Public Two-Year Colleges Public Four-Year Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After –2.7689∗∗ –2.6876∗∗ –0.0220 –0.0413
(0.1131) (0.1371) (0.0529) (0.0661)
States with Large Aid Programs (incentives to reduce support to capture federal funds)
High aid state –0.4049∗∗ –0.5501∗∗ –0.1014 0.0439
(0.1079) (0.1453) (0.0617) (0.0926)
After   high aid state 1.5564∗∗ 0.9681∗∗ –0.0374 0.0381
(0.1700) (0.2999) (0.0570) (0.0867)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible students –0.2433∗∗ 0.2140∗∗
(0.0676) (0.0538)
After   many credit-eligible –0.2344 –0.0438
(0.1793) (0.0777)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and higher state aid)
High aid   many eligible 0.0970 –0.2160∗∗
(0.1469) (0.1015)
After   high aid   many eligible 1.0460∗∗ –0.0726
(0.3654) (0.1119)
No. of colleges 730 705 521 513
No. of observations 5,110 4,935 3,647 3,591
R2 0.1925 0.1989 0.0528 0.0652
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. State support for higher education
is measured by state appropriations to a college divided by FTE enrollment. Monetary
amounts are in 2000 dollars. All models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for college se-
lectivity, the region of the college, and state characteristics (annual unemployment rate, an-
nual per capita income, and 1990 percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree). High
state aid is deﬁned as being ranked as one of the top eight states in 1997–1998 in total grant
aid or per-student aid. Georgia, Florida, and New Mexico are excluded because they have
large aid programs that cover full tuition and therefore do not have the same incentive to raise
tuition prices.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.proven record of supporting major aid programs for students continued to
follow this mission and perhaps even bolstered it in the face of the federal
policy. Although the results have the expected negative signs, the models
provide no evidence that states altered their state support for public four-
year colleges after the introduction of the tax credits.
3.5.4 The Eﬀect on College Pricing
States were not the only actors to be aﬀected by the new policy. Colleges
also had incentives to increase their prices among the beneﬁciaries of the
tax credits. Therefore, table 3.19 explores whether public colleges with
many credit-eligible students and lower tuition costs increased their list
prices faster than other schools after controlling for the aforementioned
changes in state appropriations. The ﬁrst two models suggest that diﬀeren-
tial trends were not evident among either of these groups. However, col-
leges that cost between $1,000 and $2,000 and had many credit-eligible stu-
dents did experience 18 percent faster growth in tuition prices relative to
schools with fewer potential recipients or a more expensive price. Dissim-
ilar results are found for public four-year colleges. The less expensive col-
leges witnessed relative reductions in list price after the introduction of the
credits and no diﬀerence between schools with fewer or greater numbers of
credit-eligible students.45
Again, these results may be driven by comparisons of colleges in the
Southeast and far West relative to colleges in the Mideast and Great Lakes
regions. Therefore, table 3.20 breaks down the analysis within the three
largest regions. In the Southeast, while colleges with more potential recip-
ients experienced relative reductions in price, the opposite was true in the
far West. As theory predicts, colleges with many credit-eligible students
experienced a 25 percent relative increase in list price in comparison to
schools with fewer potential recipients. The results are much clearer
among low-cost colleges. Colleges in the Southeast that cost less than
$1,000 prior to the tax credits experienced 32 percent faster growth in cost
than colleges priced above $2,000. Likewise, colleges in the $1,000 to
$2,000 range increased their prices by 11 percent after 1997. Similar results
are found in the Southwest and far West regions among the less expensive
colleges, suggesting that the incentives by price level were adequately
strong for colleges to react to them.
Table 3.21 investigates the patterns of colleges in high-aid states. In this
case, both public two-year and four-year schools in states with large aid
programs raised their tuition prices faster than colleges in other states (by
4.8 and 17.1 percent, respectively). Furthermore, among the public two-
year colleges, schools with many credit-eligible students experienced faster
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45. Separate analysis was done on room and board trends, but no statistically signiﬁcant
results were found.tuition growth than others. This provides further evidence that colleges did
react to the credits by raising prices at the schools with the greatest incen-
tives. Given the composition of the states in this high-aid group, it is pos-
sible that the variable is really detecting a diﬀerential response to the tax
credits in large versus small states. To test this hypothesis, the sample was
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Table 3.19 Impact of the Tax Credits on Public Colleges by Tuition Price 
(dependent variable: log of list in-state tuition price)
Public Two-Year Colleges Public Four-Year Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After –0.0968∗∗ –0.0899∗∗ –0.0854∗∗ –0.1983∗∗ –0.1916∗∗ –0.1667∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0194) (0.0365) (0.0190) (0.0165) (0.0210)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible  0.4353∗∗ 0.1954∗∗ 0.2862∗∗ 0.2586∗∗
students (0.0366) (0.0261) (0.0207) (0.0200)
After   many credit- 0.0016 0.0008 –0.0122 –0.0411
eligible (0.0229) (0.0418) (0.0299) (0.0312)
Low-Tuition (incentives to raise tuition due to price and income eﬀects)
Tuition  $1,000 –1.2201∗∗ –1.0687∗∗
(0.0400) (0.0430)
After   tuition 0.0556∗ 0.0415
 $1,000 (0.0314) (0.0432)
Tuition $1,001–2,000 –0.5067∗∗ –0.4053∗∗ –0.3018∗∗ –0.1946∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0388) (0.0202) (0.0196)
After   tuition $1,001– –0.0401 –0.0477 –0.0976∗∗ –0.1239∗∗
2,000 (0.0285) (0.0424) (0.0388) (0.0406)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and low-tuition)
Tuition  $1,000   many –0.0357
eligible (0.0345)
After    $1,000   many 0.0193
eligible (0.0540)
$1,001–2,000   many 0.0856 –0.2480∗∗
eligible (0.0945) (0.0423)
After   $1–2,000   many 0.1790∗∗ –0.0238
eligible (0.0805) (0.1627)
No. of colleges 705 730 705 513 521 513
No. of observations 4,902 5,067 4,902 3,523 3,574 3,523
R2 0.6493 0.7815 0.7991 0.6074 0.5931 0.6519
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary amounts are in 2000 dollars. All
models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for state appropriations per FTE student, college selectiv-
ity, the region of the college, and state characteristics (annual unemployment rate, annual per capita in-
come, and 1990 percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree). Tuition groups are deﬁned based
on tuition levels during 1997–1998.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.limited to the top ﬁfteen states in population, and the models were reesti-
mated. For this analysis the sample size dropped from 1,251 to 709 public
colleges. Even with this restriction, the aforementioned results remained
the same, suggesting that they are not due to the relative reactions of larger
states.
The pricing trends of private colleges are examined in table 3.22. Speci-
ﬁcation 1 compares colleges with and without many credit-eligible stu-
dents. Contrary to theory, the schools with the larger treatment experi-
enced a small relative reduction in price. The second two models instead
examine patterns by prepolicy tuition level. Unlike public institutions, no
colleges charge less than $2,000. However, the private colleges that charge
less than $5,000 have slightly stronger incentives to raise price due to the
LLTC (the marginal cost to students with the LLTC is 80 percent). These
models suggest that these colleges did not have statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ferential pricing trends even when the variables were interacted with the
proportion of potential recipients. Further analysis by type of state also
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Table 3.20 The College Response to the Tax Credits by Region 
(dependent variable: log of list tuition price)
Southeast Region Southwest Region Far West Region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After –0.0252 –0.1922∗∗ –0.3714∗∗ –0.3751∗∗ –0.0688 –0.1821∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0471) (0.0359) (0.0414) (0.0547) (0.0624)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible  0.3432∗∗ 0.3594∗∗ 0.5006∗∗
students (0.0339) (0.1046) (0.0648)
After   many credit- –0.2328∗∗ 0.0078 0.2544∗∗
eligible (0.0567) (0.0908) (0.0624)
Low-Tuition (incentives to raise tuition due to price and income eﬀects)
Tuition  $1,000 –0.9967∗∗ –1.0226∗∗ –1.6389∗∗
(0.0496) (0.0866) (0.1424)
After   tuition  $1,000 0.3189∗∗ 0.1443∗∗ –0.0132
(0.0518) (0.0728) (0.0750)
Tuition $1,001–2,000 –0.3880∗∗ –0.4976∗∗ –0.4909∗∗
(0.0389) (0.0664) (0.0848)
After   tuition 0.1087∗∗ –0.0028 0.2249∗∗
$1,001–2,000 (0.0507) (0.0777) (0.0619)
No. of colleges 365 371 139 148 133 141
No. of observations 2,550 2,588 965 1,022 865 916
R2 0.6340 0.7717 0.4772 0.5926 0.7782 0.8966
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: See table 3.19.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.does not suggest that colleges reacted to the tax credits. Therefore, any
impact on colleges appears to have been concentrated within the public
realm.
3.6 Conclusions
The 1997 passage of the HTC and LLTC signiﬁcantly increased federal
support for higher education. According to the Department of Education,
the estimated cost of the policy could exceed the amount spent on other
major programs like Title I, Head Start, and the School Lunch Program.
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Table 3.21 Impact of the Tax Credits on Colleges in High-Aid States 
(dependent variable: log of list in-state tuition price)
Public Two-Year Colleges Public Four-Year Colleges
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After –0.1154∗∗ –0.0977∗∗ –0.2402∗∗ –0.2190∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0212)
Colleges in States with Large Aid Programs (incentives to raise tuition to capture federal funds)
High aid state –0.1911∗∗ –0.6559∗∗ 0.0614∗ 0.0293
(0.0512) (0.0958) (0.0360) (0.0402)
After   high aid state 0.0478∗∗ –0.1115∗∗ 0.1712∗∗ 0.1870∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0341) (0.0233) (0.0338)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible students 0.2750∗∗ 0.2780∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0274)
After   many credit-eligible –0.0654∗∗ –0.0513
(0.0293) (0.0412)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and higher state aid)
High aid   many eligible 0.7392∗∗ 0.0697
(0.1129) (0.0427)
After   high aid   many eligible 0.2510∗∗ –0.0234
(0.0436) (0.0518)
No. of colleges 730 705 521 513
No. of observations 5,067 4,902 3,574 3,523
R2 0.5776 0.6967 0.5339 0.6228
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary amounts are in 2000 dol-
lars. All models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for state appropriations per FTE stu-
dent, college selectivity, the region of the college, and state characteristics (annual unemploy-
ment rate, annual per capita income, and 1990 percentage of the population with a bachelor’s
degree). High state aid is deﬁned as being ranked as one of the top eight states in 1997–1998
in total grant aid or per-student aid. Georgia, Florida, and New Mexico are excluded because
they have large aid programs that cover full tuition and therefore do not have the same incen-
tive to raise tuition prices.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 3.22 Impact of the Tax Credits on Private Four-Year Colleges 
(dependent variable: log of list in-state tuition price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 0.0421∗∗ 0.0338∗∗ 0.0403∗∗ 0.0447∗∗ 0.0447∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0087) (0.0120) (0.0101) (0.0114)
Many Credit-Eligible Students (most aﬀected by the introduction of the tax credits)
Many credit-eligible  0.4369∗∗ 0.4107∗∗ 0.4592∗∗
students (0.0251) (0.0229) (0.0319)
After   many credit- –0.0273∗∗ –0.0277∗∗ –0.0246∗
eligible (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0131)
Low-Tuition (incentives to raise tuition due to price and income eﬀects)
Tuition $2,001–5,000 –0.8881∗∗ –0.7824∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0450)
After   tuition $2,001– –0.0242 –0.0221
5,000 (0.0267) (0.0316)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and low-tuition)
$2,001–5,000   many –0.2983∗∗
eligible (0.0614)
After   $2–5,000   many –0.0105
eligible (0.0524)
Colleges in States with Large Aid Programs (incentives to raise tuition to capture federal funds)
High aid state 0.1253∗∗ 0.1269∗∗
(0.0409) (0.0470)
After   high aid state –0.0207 –0.0032
(0.0154) (0.0286)
Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences (many credit-eligible and higher state aid)
High aid   many eligible –0.0638
(0.0521)
After   high aid   many –0.0076
eligible (0.0290)
No. of colleges 874 937 874 937 874
No. of observations 6,059 6,483 6,059 6,483 6,059
R2 0.4456 0.3716 0.5974 0.2214 0.4505
Source: IPEDS data from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000.
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Monetary amounts are in 2000 dollars. All
models include year ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for college selectivity, the region of the college, and state
characteristics (annual unemployment rate, annual per capita income, and 1990 percentage of the pop-
ulation with a bachelor’s degree). Tuition groups are deﬁned based on tuition levels during 1997–1998.
High state aid is deﬁned as being ranked as one of the top eight states in 1997–1998 in total grant aid or
per-student aid. Georgia, Florida, and New Mexico are excluded because they have large aid programs
that cover full tuition and therefore do not have the same incentive to raise tuition prices.
∗∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.The introduction of the tax credits also marks a new direction for ﬁnancial
aid, as the distinctive features of the HTC and LLTC set them apart from
other ﬁnancial aid programs. First, eligibility requirements are broadly de-
ﬁned so that up to two-thirds of the population could qualify for a credit
based on the income criteria. In addition, the timing of the support in re-
lation to attendance diﬀers greatly from aid that is awarded at the time
when the individual enrolls. As a result, the distribution of the credits, their
impact on enrollment, and their inﬂuence on the behavior of states and
postsecondary institutions are unique compared to other federal initia-
tives.
What was intended to be a transfer to the middle class has indeed bene-
ﬁted middle-income families. Insuﬃcient tax liability due to low income
levels, competing tax credits and deductions, and the interaction with
other aid programs prevents many low-income individuals from qualifying
for the aid. Conversely, income ceilings prevent high-income families from
beneﬁting. As shown by IRS data on individual tax returns, proportion-
ately more of the tax credits were claimed by returns with an AGI above
$30,000. For the 2000 tax year, nearly half of the credits claimed in 2000
were by returns with an AGI between $30,000 and $75,000, although this
group makes up only 35 percent of the eligible returns. In a similar manner,
although they make up only 13 percent of returns, families with AGIs be-
tween $50,000 and $75,000 claimed 22 percent of all education credits dur-
ing tax year 2000 and realized the largest credit on average. However, when
the amount in credits is compared to federal tax liability, the greatest ben-
eﬁciaries of the tax credits were those with incomes between $10,000 and
$30,000.
Although the maximum HTC and LLTC were $1,500 and $1,000, re-
spectively, for the time period of this analysis, the actual mean beneﬁts
were far below these levels. According to IRS data, the average credit was
$731 in 2000. Moreover, the substantial number of nontaxable returns, an
approximation of the returns with insuﬃcient tax liability to claim a credit,
suggests that many families were unable to get the full beneﬁt for which
they were eligible.
While tax credits are a new and distinct form of ﬁnancial aid, the deliv-
ery of support through the tax system suﬀers from some of the same infor-
mation problems that plague other programs such as the Pell Grant. Usage
during the ﬁrst three years was far below projections. Moreover, among el-
igible college students according to income level, enrollment behavior, and
net tuition expenses, only one-third claimed a credit during the second year
of the program. However, participation continues to climb, and if the ex-
perience with the EITC is any indication, take-up rates could become
greater than for other forms of college ﬁnancial aid.
As with any ﬁnancial aid program, one would hope that the HTC and
LLTC positively aﬀect the enrollment patterns of beneﬁciaries. First, the
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students to invest in more higher education by altering the marginal cost
for students to increase their expenditures. For example, the marginal cost
to a HTC recipient who wants to buy $800 of education rather than $500
is zero since the credit would cover the entire expense up to $1,000. How-
ever, this study found no evidence that the policy aﬀected attendance be-
havior. Using a large sample of individuals from 1990 to 2000, the analysis
did not ﬁnd increased postsecondary enrollment among credit-eligible stu-
dents after the introduction of the HTC and LLTC. Additionally, the mod-
els tested whether college students increased their investments in higher
education by being more likely to choose a four-year rather than two-year
institution or attend full-time rather than part-time. Again, there was no
discernable eﬀect on the behavior of students aﬀected by the tax credits.
Therefore, although the stated goal of the tax credits was to increase ac-
cess to higher education, they do not appear to have encouraged additional
postsecondary enrollment. It is not surprising that no enrollment eﬀect
was found, given the design of the program. Foremost, the main beneﬁci-
aries of the tax credits are unlikely to be students on the margin of attend-
ing college. The low take-up rate of the credits also suggests that not
enough families may know about the beneﬁt for it to have a discernible im-
pact on enrollment. Additionally, the disconnect between the timing of the
beneﬁt and college enrollment is likely to limit the eﬀect of the credits on
college access and choice. Nonetheless, the limitations of the CPS data
used in the analysis prompt the need for further research in this area.
On the other hand, states and institutions appear to have responded to
the HTC and LLTC. The analysis suggests that many states reacted by re-
ducing appropriations to public two-year colleges at which students faced
a lower marginal cost due to lower tuition levels. These results are robust
to analysis within region. Moreover, there is some evidence to support that
public two-year colleges responded to incentives created by the tax credits
by raising tuition price beyond what can be explained by ﬂuctuations in
state support, and the responses were stronger for schools with a greater
proportion of credit-eligible students. However, some of the model esti-
mates did not conform to the predictions of theory. Most notably, states
with large aid programs (although not the colleges within them) seemed to
have continued their eﬀorts to support higher education even after the in-
troduction of HTC and LLTC. Additionally, public four-year colleges of-
ten were found not to have the expected diﬀerential trends after the policy
change or had ones that were in the opposite direction. As with any anal-
ysis of this kind, other trends during the late 1990s may be driving the re-
sults, although numerous controls attempt to account for diﬀerences in
college selectivity, region, and state economic trends.
It is important to note that all colleges had incentives to raise price since
the credits increased student incomes. Since these results only highlight the
Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Expenses 161relative diﬀerences in trends for low-tuition colleges rather than the price
trends of all schools, it is possible that the true eﬀect of the credits on in-
stitutions has been much larger. Furthermore, if colleges raised tuition in
response to the tax credits, this may help to explain why little enrollment
eﬀect was found. These results document the importance of considering
how a federal program aﬀects the behavior of states and institutions in
ways that might undermine the original policy.
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Comment Michael McPherson
This is an informative and inventive paper on an important topic. Good ev-
idence on the incidence and eﬀects of federal tax credits for college is hard
to come by, in part because the programs are still pretty new and in part be-
cause it is hard to get adequate evidence about the characteristics of recip-
ients of the tax credits. I will organize my comments around three elements
of Long’s paper: the incidence (or distributional impact) of the tax credits;
their eﬀects on students; and their eﬀects on institutions.
Incidence of the Federal Higher Education Tax Credits
Long ﬁnds that the two tax credits are an eﬀective mechanism for deliv-
ering beneﬁts to middle-class families, which was presumably a major goal
of the programs. At least for now, the take-up rate on the credits is rather
low but will probably rise as people (including tax advisors) get a better
handle on the opportunities oﬀered by the credits. The addition in the Bush
tax cuts of 2001 of a deduction for college costs as an alternative to the
Hope or Lifetime Learning Credits will certainly extend the learning curve
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Michael McPherson is president of the Spencer Foundation.for families ﬁguring out how best to take advantage of these tax opportu-
nities.
It’s frustrating that, so far at least, available data make it diﬃcult to sort
out the income proﬁle of families with dependent students who receive the
credits from the income proﬁle of independent students. It is clearly very
diﬀerent for a middle-aged family with children of college age to receive a
credit than it is for, say, two married thirty-year-old graduate students. Un-
fortunately at this point the distributional data available from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) combine these two groups of recipients.
Presumably the IRS microdata that will become available will help sort
out the income proﬁles of these two groups. The National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study, whose 1999–2000 data have recently become available,
may be helpful on this question as well.
Of course, beyond recognizing that the tax credit programs do indeed
reach middle-income families, it is also of interest to track who within these
populations beneﬁts. Among middle-aged families, clearly these credits fa-
vor families with children and with children who attend college. Among
younger, independent students, beneﬁts accrue to those who pursue col-
lege education and particularly (for the Lifetime Learning Credit) those
who pursue graduate or professional education.
Eﬀects on Students
Long rightly points out that one publicly declared purpose of the tax
credits was to raise college enrollments. It’s not clear, though, how serious
an aim this was. The legislative history indicates that the Clinton adminis-
tration’s main purpose was to oﬀer an alternative to capital gains tax cuts
that would be more favorable to the middle class. It is instructive that the
early estimates by the Treasury Department of the cost of the tax credits
assumed there would be no enrollment eﬀects.
Long indeed oﬀers several good reasons for expecting the credits to have
at best a small eﬀect on enrollments. In addition to the points she makes, it
may be worth adding that since postsecondary attendance is already pretty
high for young high school graduates from middle-income families, there
isn’t much room for increases in attendance among that population.
If one tries to think about who has the strongest incentive to change be-
havior in response to the credits, it may well be those adults who have
HOPE eligibility and the right income levels to qualify for the beneﬁt, plus
the ability to go more than half-time in order to qualify. Empirically, how-
ever, as Turner shows in her piece in this volume, it is rare for adults who
have never started college to begin after the age of twenty—and only people
in their ﬁrst or second year of college are eligible for the HOPE Credit.
The other place to look for behavioral eﬀects, then, might be among
adults who attend part-time and who qualify for the Lifetime Learning
166 Bridget Terry LongCredit. The partial federal subsidy for additional credits might induce
adults to take more courses than they would otherwise. Detecting these
eﬀects would require very good data.
Eﬀects on Institutions
It is in a sense reassuring to see Long’s evidence that state institutions re-
spond rationally to the incentives to raise prices created by the tax credits.
When the federal government introduced what are now called Pell Grants,
it was obvious that public institutions with zero tuition could gain revenue
by introducing tuition—a point that was made, controversially, in 1972
when the Keppel Task Force recommended introducing tuition at the City
University of New York. The Task Force observed the following:
New York state students and institutions will fail to some degree to qual-
ify for Federal funds under the new statutes unless the public institutions
charge higher tuitions than they do at present....  [ W e ]  consider it ex-
tremely important that the State take maximum advantage of Federal
funding in order to reduce the burden on State taxpayers. (Task Force on
Financing Higher Education 1972, 5, 15)
The same logic plainly applies in states with tuition low enough that stu-
dents can gain additional tax credit dollars from higher tuition.
Long’s evidence that states respond to tax credits reminds us that her es-
timates of the eﬀects of the tax credits on students are reduced-form esti-
mates. To the extent that schools raise prices in response to the credits, the
observed enrollment response will be attenuated, compared to an analysis
that focused on the impact of the credits holding tuition constant. In prin-
ciple, some kind of multiple-equation structural analysis of these relation-
ships would be desirable, but to attempt this with available data would be
a huge stretch.
There is a second kind of institutional eﬀect that might be anticipated
from the tax credits. To the extent that colleges award ﬁnancial aid to stu-
dents in the form of price discounts, the availability of the tax credits gives
institutions an incentive to reduce those discounts. Indeed, schools em-
ploying standard need analysis normally recognize that the receipt of tax
credits expands a family’s ability to pay and therefore reduces their need for
student aid. There is heavy political pressure on colleges not to “capture”
gains from the college tuition tax credits through this device (and indeed it
is illegal to reduce eligibility for federal student aid grant awards on the ba-
sis of such an analysis.) Nonetheless, dollars going to student aid are fairly
fungible, and ﬁnancial aid oﬃcers have signiﬁcant discretion in determin-
ing need, so it is quite possible that substitution of tax credits for institu-
tion-based student aid occurs. It would be interesting to try to estimate
such eﬀects.
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I will conclude with two broader comments, one on theoretical public ﬁ-
nance and a second on political economy.
Ted Schultz, an architect of human capital theory, observed long ago
that, to the degree that spending on education is an investment in future
earnings, there is an argument for making the spending tax deductible. An-
alytically, it is certainly interesting to ask what would be the optimal tax
treatment of higher education investments in a general equilibrium frame-
work. Under conditions of perfect competition, without externalities, and
assuming that college is strictly an investment in future earning power, it is
plausible on eﬃciency grounds that such investments should be fully tax
deductible (a point I have heard Bill Gale make in conversation). Clearly,
in practice, higher education is a mix of consumption and investment ac-
tivity and is subsidized in a variety of ways, so it is far from obvious what
practical consequences might ﬂow from this theoretical point.
Finally, regarding political economy, it is of interest to note that during
the 1990s the share of state government expenditures going to higher
education fell, and in many states the real level of state appropriations
to higher education fell. This came about because of tax limitation move-
ments in many states and the ascendance of other budget priorities, in-
cluding Medicaid, elementary and secondary education, and prisons.
Many states permitted tuitions in public higher education to rise pretty
rapidly in percentage terms to oﬀset the falloﬀ in state support. Not sur-
prisingly, these tuition increases produced unhappiness among middle-
class voters, and surely that unhappiness was one signiﬁcant motivation for
President Clinton’s enthusiasm for tuition tax credits. Viewed in that light,
this entire episode can be viewed as a kind of weird reverse federalism, with
tax credits for college tuition helping to oﬀset increases in public tuition
occasioned by state budget pressures. Unfortunately, though not surpris-
ingly, the losers in this shifting ﬁscal picture are poor families, who get hit
with the tuition increases but who, as Long shows, do not receive the full
beneﬁt of the tax credits.
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